Supplemental Readings on Iran

A couple of months ago, I posted about the last the post-revolutionary relationship between Iran and the West. I wanted to post a few additional items to supplement that post.

First and foremost, I omitted a major subset of incidents. In two separate incidents (2004 and 2007), Iranian naval forces detained British sailors and Royal Marines. (The second incident followed an Iranian attempt to do the same against some Australian sailors which didn't quite work out for the Iranians (link, link). During the 2007 incident, the crisis led to a dispute over where the British personnel had actually been (link, link). I apologize for omitting these incidents in the earlier post, but the volume of that post should serve as an indicator of just how many relevant incidents there are to keep track of.

In addition to that, and to the other prior links, here are some items that may be of interest to those of you who are interested in Iran:

Gulf Roundtable: Iran's Regional Strategy

This Week at War: The Persian Gulf needs its own NATO

U.S. arms to Gulf allies hint of strategy

Saudi Coast Guard Arrests 21 Iranians

Iran for the first time stages cyber warfare drill: report

Iran warns planes near Hormuz

Iran navy launches 6-day massive exercises

Iran starts navy drills near Strait of Hormuz

Iran starts war games in Strait of Hormuz

Iran plans naval drill in Hormuz Strait, flexing military muscle

Iran begins naval war games and to carry drill in Strait of Hormuz

The Iranian View of Stage Two of the Arab Spring

Iranian Influence, Rising Asian Powers, and the Significance of Yemen

Iran and the Gulf Military Balance: Parts I & II: New Ninth Edition

Britain could deploy more troops to Gulf, says David Cameron

Iran's Rouhani takes on Revolutionary Guards in detente drive

"Investing" in The Iraqi Dinar

Bottom Line Up Front: I wouldn't recommend that anyone "invest" in the Iraqi dinar.

I was very interested to find that the BBC has been doing some reporting on a new effort to get people to "invest" in the Iraqi dinar. I say "new" because while I was working in the Middle East, there were folks who spent a lot of money, some of them thousands of dollars, to buy Iraqi dinars. Since the 2003 invasion and subsequent (and tumultuous) reset of the Iraqi economy, some people have been convinced that if they buy a lot of Iraqi dinars, they'll be able to get rich overnight during what they're told is an inevitable increase in the dinar's value relative to other global currencies. As skeptical as I remain of Twitter, it appears that the folks at the BBC have done a good job of investigating this latest episode in the ongoing Iraqi dinar saga. You can read the article (#BBCtrending: #Wearethepeople and the 'fraudulent' dinar ruse), download the podcast, or listen online.

When I was in the Middle East, I had co-workers and subordinates, even some whose judgment I typically trusted, had "invested" in the Iraqi dinar. There was even a fiasco in our company housing when a member of the cleaning staff was accused of stealing dinars from various folks' hidden stashes. The housing company wound up being on the hook to repay every claimant - though not in Iraqi dinars - and it was particularly suspicious how many folks came out of the woodwork upon the announcement that payouts would take place, and also how many folks had been in possession of exactly one million Iraqi dinars.

That having been said, one of my other employees (who lived on the economy instead of in company housing) was quite open about his desire to wallpaper his post-deployment bathroom with Iraqi dinars. That wasn't the worst idea I'd ever heard. Still isn't.

Multiple Items: Gulf Security and Nuclear Issues

My last two posts (Iranian Nuclear Issues and Sensitive Information Protection and Thoughts on Computer Network Defense) were originally meant to be a single post covering a couple of independent issues in short succession. I failed at that goal. I'm going to attempt it again today with even more topics, all related to strategy and international security.

I've been seeing a number of articles about the Kuwaiti citizen body's anxiety over a new GCC security accord. (‘GCC Pact In Harmony With Kuwaiti Laws’; Treaty will Ensure Coordination Among Security Agencies) One of the big arguments appears to be that the new accord conflicts with the Kuwaiti constitution. Saudi Arabia is the proverbial "first among equals" in the GCC, and it's entirely possible that the Kuwaitis are reticent after the 2011 Saudi/GCC security force deployment to Bahrain (more on that here.) In late 2012, the GCC members also agreed to unify members' military forces under a single command. I haven't had a chance to drill down further into this issue, so if I find something else of note, I'll share it.

Another item I've been seeing pop up recently is concern about GCC nationals returning from fighting in Syria. (MP warns of Syria fighters) The Kuwaitis have been concerned about this for a while now ; like the Iraq War before it, the Syrian civil war has become a proxy conflict between the Sunni and Shia sects. The Iranians have supported the Syrian Alawite regime with funding, equipment, advisors, and fighters; meanwhle, several Gulf states (notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar) have supported Sunni rebel groups with weapons, funding, and relief supplies. I read an article last week, again out of Kuwait, that said that Saudi King Abdullah has issued a decree requiring the incarceration of Saudis who fight in or support conflicts abroad. The Saudis had some previous experience with these issues as the primary sponsors of the Arab Afghans, the most famous of whom was Osama bin Laden. The Gulf States walk a thin line between pursuing their strategic agenda (for which their military forces are seldom an appropriate option), and balancing that strategic agenda with domestic security considerations.

Last week, I talked about a February 2013 CNAS paper claiming that the Saudis are unlikely to pursue a domestic nuclear program (though I thought their case undermined their actual thesis - I was more convinced of potential Saudi nuclear ambitions after reading the report). I also cited a BBC article which claimed that the Saudis would pursue a nuclear option if Iran got one. The National Journal published an article on Friday which claims that the Saudis are investigating a uranium enrichment program. Rhetoric about Iran's nuclear program usually focuses on the threat to either America or Israel; but in my mind, the big risk from a notional Iranian nuclear weapons capability is that it would spark a de facto arms race in which other nations, notably the Saudis but also Egypt and possibly Turkey, would pursue their own nuclear weapons capabilities. At that point, one gets into the question of adequate arms controls, to include command and control (C2). Those concerns are often overlooked by the commentariat, but they're of potentially greater concern than the direct risks of upsetting the present nuclear status quo.

Continuing with the discussion of nuclear issues, there are two items of note to share today. The first is disappointing: Red Cross to the World: Eliminate Nuclear Weapons ‘Once and For All’; Group says a relief operation for a nuke attack would be virtually impossible:

“The humanitarian consequences following a nuclear explosion would cause unprecedented devastation,” said Fernando Suinaga, Mexican Red Cross president and member of the Movement in Nayarit. “Any rescue or relief operation undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for those affected would be virtually impossible.”

Having taken a postgraduate course in Strategic Nuclear Doctrine, arguments such as these are always frustrating because they're generally made in ignorance of both history and doctrine. Nuclear weapons have saved the Red Cross from impossible humanitarian crises precisely because their potential impact was and is so horrific as to deter their use by a variety of potential belligerents. More encouraging is a new podcast from War on the Rocks in which the participants discuss contemporary nuclear doctrine. It's well worth the listen, and it's introduced me to a new podcast series on which I'll have to catch up.

And finally, also from WOTR, I'm quite excited to read Iran History, and Strategy by Analogy by Lawrence Freedman. (This despite the fact that Freedman wrote what may be the most convoluted book I've ever read.)

As always, more to come soon.

Thoughts on Computer Network Defense

AFP: US launches voluntary cybersecurity plan

The US administration on Wednesday launched a cybersecurity plan which aims to use voluntary collaboration from the private sector to protect critical infrastructure from computer hackers.

The initiative stems from an executive order issued last year by President Barack Obama after repeated failures in Congress of a cybersecurity law.

I could wax eloquent (and not-so-eloquent) on this topic for quite a while, but I want to identify a few key points (while endeavouring to avoid politics). For the sake of clarity, I'm blockquoting the individual points to set them apart.

1) People don't understand the risks, and/or they're only willing to mitigate them as much as they think they have to.

The reason why many businesses, and even government agencies, have failed to get up to speed on the issue of network security is twofold: they don't understand it, and the risk of damage isn't seen as commensurate to the reward of robust security. To some degree, that's starting to change, as the potential liability costs of the recent Target data breach and similar incidents are beginning to show. In that way, network security is similar to other types of security: organizations will spend precisely what they think they must, and not a penny more, because security is an overhead item that cuts into their bottom line. That's the cost/benefit analysis and/or risk management piece.

Beyond that, the leaders of many organizations simply don't understand the threat. At the risk of over-generalizing, there's a very narrow demographic that's young enough to understand en masse how modern technology works, while simultaneously remembering conditions prior to its proliferation in the last couple of decades. Outside of that portion of the demographic spectrum, you two groups. Most of those who are older than the aforementioned group are, in essence, "immigrants" to modern technology and; at best, these folks "speak" technology with a pronounced accent. Meanwhile, those younger than the aforementioned group are so accustomed to modern technology (such as social media, which conditions them to share every aspect of their lives), that they often fail to comprehend the need for confidentiality. (I've written about a couple of aspects of this challenge before, here and here.) The result is that it's very difficult for organizations to instill a culture of security awareness, either in the boardroom or in cubeville.

2) Convenience is part of the problem.

Everyone's heard the phrase "the path of least resistance". Technology has blazed its own superhighway of least resistance. We've all seen it on the micro level: people would rather use their debit card than worry about cash, or follow their GPS in lieu of learning a route. In many cases, we as a culture have largely lost the corresponding low-tech skills that most people had only a few years ago.

On the macro level, network security experts love the example of hackers being able take down a power grid, or a water or sewage system, or a variety of other public works elements that are potentially more devastating than the threat of identity theft or credit card fraud that could stem from the aforementioned Target data breach. While I'm sympathetic to the potential benefits and efficiencies afforded by networking, these examples always cause me to wonder, "Who's the genius who thought it was a good idea to hook control of a power grid up to the Internet?" In popular media, I was always intrigued by this theme in the 2003 to 2008 Battlestar Galactica TV series, in which the eponymous warship's computers were not networked in order to prevent the sort of security issues we agonize over today.

3) We need to start applying more common sense to the problem.

The problem is getting worse. For example, Comcast is now offering XFINITY® Home, which allows subscribers to wire numerous aspects of their home into their Internet for management from their mobile devices. Am I the only one who remembers this scene from Skyfall?

Now, do I think that a product like XFINITY® Home is going to lead to an epidemic of exploding homes? No, but I'm also not confident enough in home security systems - or, rather, in your average customer. A guy I used to work with was fond of saying "there's no patch for User 1.0". Between technical vectors like phone cloning or mobile phone spyware, and social media vectors like vishing and weak passwords, do we really think that the average person's phone ought to be connected to their security system? The potential for malicious and accidental catastrophes, both from user error and attacker sophistication, brings real questions regarding the cost/benefit analysis of these innovations.

None of this is to say that I'm some sort of luddite - far from it. However, many conveniences that we take for granted open vectors for unsavory elements to attack.

The DoD has some good resources for network security, but they're highly militarized. Some more user-friendly resources are available at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Computer Security Resource Center. At the risk of getting political, the Obama Administration's approach to most problems involves intensive government efforts. The truth, though, is that we as a country, and we as individuals, rely upon so many individual and networked pieces of technology that government-spearheaded efforts simply won't put a dent in the potential risks. Individuals and organizations will have to be proactive for themselves, with the understanding that the threat to sensitive information and to critical infrastructure is growing. At the same time, we need to start thinking before we automate and wire up any and every aspect of our lives. To quote Ian Malcolm:


I realize that that's three pop culture references in one post, and I can only apologize and promise to try harder next time.

Iranian Nuclear Issues and Sensitive Information Protection

AFP: Iran demands 'proof' of nuclear weapons allegations

Iran said Wednesday it would not accept longstanding allegations that its nuclear programme once had a military dimension without seeing the secret documents on which the charges are based.

First and foremost, Iran knows this isn't going to happen. That information is almost certainly classified, and part of the reason for classifying information isn't so much to protect the information itself, but to protect methods and sources. There's no doubt that Iran wants to work at figuring out those methods and sources, so that it can mitigate those information leaks in one manner or another in order to prevent future leaks of sensitive information about its nuclear program. This statement from Iran probably relates to an item from last week that I discussed on Facebook with on of my coursemates from Aberdeen, CN Slapshot. As he's well read on some of the specifics, I shall now quote him without asking permission first:

EBWs are part of what is known as 'Project 110', which intelligence sources given to the IAEA, explain as an attempt to synchronize detonations on a spherical or hemispherical device to within 130 nano seconds. While EBWs have civilian applications, such a narrow synchronization timeframe does not. Further, the Iranians might have to explain 'Project 111'- an attempt to design a warhead for the Shabab 3 MRBM that could detonate at 600m above the ground, which is a height that is completely ineffective for the deliverance of traditional ordinance. Nuclear weapons are usually airbursted- the first weapon ever used in a war was detonated at a height of 580m. Lastly, they should explain the attempted development of neutron detonators that are designed to compress uranium deuteride to produce neutrons for detonation. Such a device has no civilian application.

Iran has both financial and strategic stakes in ensuring that the current round of seemingly promising negotiations over its nuclear program don't fail; the international community has a mainly strategic stake in the same, but it also has a strategic stake in not upsetting the balance of power in the Gulf, and in not upsetting the global balance of nuclear power. Revelations such as the one in question, and several others since the deal was heralded a couple of months ago, would call an eventual comprehensive deal into question. The Iranian government wants tight control over the information about its nuclear program, just as the international community wants to protect the methods and sources it employs to collect its own information.

For what it's worth, experts are divided on the likely outcome of a notional Iranian nuclear weapons test. About a year ago, I read a report from CNAS entitled Atomic Kingdom, in which the authors argued that the Saudi government was likely to pursue nuclear security guarantees in lieu of its own nuclear program. I read the report, and thought that their data made precisely the opposite case, so I wasn't surprised when the BBC published an article corroborating my appraisal later in 2013. In January, noted American nuclear scientist Siegfried S. Hecker and former Secretary of Defense William Perry co-authored an article entitled Iran's Path to Nuclear Peace; it's worth reading, though it assumes (contrary to much of the evidence, and probably for the sake of diplomacy) that Iran's nuclear program is actually for peaceful purposes. (The article also claims that Iran doesn't have enough indigenous uranium to sustain a nuclear energy program, though I know that the IAEA recently visited an Iranian uranium mine, so I'm not sure whether that's a disconnect or if Iran's mines just don't have much uranium.) Two other recent posturing incidents on Iran's part are its claim that it's going to sail an (apparently quite modest fleet near American territorial waters, and an apparent successful missile test from earlier this week.

I want to get back to the topic of classified and/or sensitive information, because looking at the critical information elements of this dispute (from both the Iranian and non-Iranian perspectives) can provide some valuable lessons for companies and individuals.

I can't remember the source off the top of my head, but either a fictional drama about espionage, or else a source from last year's Strategic Intelligence course, talks about methods and motivators to get people to hand over sensitive information. Motivations for an agent can range wildly; a source could be convinced that his country gives him no grounds to be patriotic, or that providing the information is actually an expression of his own patriotism. Others are persuaded by blackmail - for example, the KGB and GRU Were well known for sending prostitutes to consort with various intelligence targets in bugged hotel rooms in order to discredit them, or else to blackmail them for information. (I've heard rumors that certain Middle Eastern regimes have done the same sort of thing.) Another motivator is money, which is why vetting for security clearances often includes both credit checks to ensure that potential employees aren't under pressure from large debts; and lifestyle appraisals to ensure that those same potential employees won't get themselves into a situation in which the promise of money would entice them. As I noted in my Strategic Intelligence term paper:

One example of this is the Robert Hanssen case, in which an FBI counterintelligence officer was convicted of having accepted payment of $1.4 million in cash and diamonds over the course of twenty-two years - an average of only about $64,000 per year[1], substantially less than the annual operating cost of most SIGINT assets and considerably less than the cost of a single GEOINT asset. Similarly illustrative is the case of Ronald William Pelton, who betrayed Operation Ivy Bells - the U.S. Navy's operation to tap unencrypted Soviet communications cables in the Sea of Okhotsk - for a mere $40,000.[2] [1] Wise, David; Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America; Random House; New York City, New York; 2003 [2] Drew, Christopher and Sontag, Sherry and Annette Lawrence Drew; Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage; PublicAffairs; New York City, New York; 1998

When one considers how delicate and labor-intensive vetting, information security measures, and asset recruiting efforts are, it's easy to see why so many national security folks are upset with people like Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, and Edward Snowden.
The same concepts can be distilled down to the corporate level. One way I've heard this explained is through the invocation of the "New York Times Rule" and its "Karachi Corollary": if you don't want your boss to see something on the front page of the New York Times, or for a terrorist to be able to find it while sitting at an Internet cafe in Karachi, Pakistan, then you need to protect your information accordingly. I'm obviously not talking about corporations hiding their efforts to construct an illicit nuclear program. Instead, I'm talking about corporations, or any organization or individual, taking appropriate measures to protect their own critical information. I've talked about the Five Step OPSEC Process before, but it's never a bad time to review it:

1) Identify critical information
2) Threat analysis
3) Vulnerability analysis
4) Risk assessment
5) Implement OPSEC Measures

While I wouldn't recommend that individuals or companies develop illicit nuclear weapons, I would recommend that they learn from the ongoing dispute with Iran, and protect their sensitive information accordingly.

Austerity and Naval Strategy

As I've noted previously, I'm a longtime student of naval strategy. I wanted to take this opportunity to share a few articles I've collected over the last few years. The question of how to continue safeguarding American interests while searching for efficiencies has been both prominent and contentious for several years now, and the Navy has spent those last few years quietly pursuing a pretty effective campaign of doing just that. As I noted in my dissertation:

Western militaries have recently considered a variety of options for managing international security challenges with a smaller footprint. Naval advocates, for example, propose a variety of approaches, from fielding modified destroyers optimized for stand-alone missions[1] ; to increased emphasis on comparatively inexpensive amphibious assault ships[2] ; vice supercarriers.[3] (The experimental 2012 conversion of USS Ponce into a Gulf-based logistics platform[4] ironically reflects the use of similar assets off the Dhofari coast to facilitate logistical support for Operation Badree.[5]) These approaches mirror the 2011 NATO campaign in Libya, in which amphibious vessels spearheaded operations utilizing embarked V/STOL aircraft and attack helicopters[6], vice a supercarrier and air wing.

[1] Albaugh, Kurt; “Six Frigates and the Future of Gunboat Diplomacy”; Small Wars Journal; Bethesda, MD; 04APR2011; http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/722-albaugh.pdf

[2] Axe, David; Navy’s Newest Assault Ship Moonlights as Pint-Sized Aircraft Carrier; Wired.com; N/A; 22OCT2012; http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/navy-mini-carrier/

[3] Ottens, Nick; Amphibs vs Carriers: Which Has the Future?; Atlantic Sentinel; N/A; 29JUL2011; http://atlanticsentinel.com/2011/07/amphibs-vs-carriers-which-has-the-future/

[4] N/A; ‘Floating base’ deploys to Gulf: US Navy; Agence France-Presse; Washington, D.C.; 07JUL2012; http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/floating-base-deploys-to-gulf-us-navy-1.1045755

[5] Monick, S.; “Victory in Hades: The Forgotten Wars of Oman 1957-1959 and 1970-1976, Part 2A: The Dhofar Campaign 1970-1976”; Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 12, Nr 4; Saldanha, South Africa; 1982; http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/600 ; pp. 23

[6] N/A; Libya: UK Apache helicopters used in Nato attacks; BBC; N/A; 04JUN2011; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13651736

A few additional notes.

1) Because I was writing about the Dhofar Rebellion, I compared the deployment of USS Ponce with the deployment of a similar vessel off the Dhofari coast during Operation Badree. I was unaware until recently that a similar approach was used in Falklands War of 1982. The US Navy is currently expanding upon this capability (source, source) as a continuation of its use of the Ponce. As that first source article notes:

The idea is for these cheaper vessels wherever possible to take the places of the Navy’s front-line destroyers, cruisers, amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, maintaining American presence on routine patrols while freeing up the tougher, more expensive warships like the flattop Ford to prepare for what they do best: fight a full-on shooting war.

The Navy has made some other smart purchases as well. I've already noted their pursuit of economies of scale by capitalizing on the F/A-18 platform. The Navy has also been able to develop economies of scale in the production of the Virginia Class submarine fleet, as well as converting four of the existing Ohio Class ballistic missile submarines instead of retiring them entirely in accordance with treaties between the United States and Russia. The Littoral Combat Ship has been a bit more problematic, but the Navy's overall record has been strong - arguably stronger than those of its peers.

Just for Fun: Mapping the Hornbeam Line

I've written extensively on the Operation Highlander blog about my dissertation on the Dhofar Rebellion. As regular readers of both the Operation Highlander blog and this one may have gathered, I'm fascinated by geography and maps. One of the things I tried to do was to compare the handful of available maps from the conflict with the various maps available through Wikimapia and Google Maps. Several years spent undergoing classroom instruction from the Marine Corps taught me just how critical a factor geography is to the prosecution of a military campaign, and my study of the conflict in Dhofar inspired a big interest in the geography of that particular campaign.

It took some creative work combining Wikimapia, PowerPoint, and Windows Paint, but I was finally able to find the final Location: Patrol Base Pipe
Coordinates: 16.882449° N, 53.759724° E
Remarks: Located using maps from In the Service of the Sultan by Ian Gardiner and We Won a War by John Akehurst. If location is correct, position appears to be abnormally small.

Location: Patrol Base Whale
Coordinates: 16.927313° N, 53.747848° E
Remarks: N/A

Location: Patrol Base Ashawq/Ashoq
Coordinates: 16.936920° N, 53.735703° E
Remarks: N/A

Location: Patrol Base Killi
Coordinates: 16.972069° N, 53.731915° E
Remarks: Site displays distinct square seen elsewhere at PB Reef and PB Bole.

Location: Patrol Base Killi (Satellite)
Coordinates: 16.975117° N, 53.733069° E
Remarks: Small position with circular formations located west and northeast of due center. Possible PB Killi satellite observation post.

Location: Patrol Base Reef
Coordinates: 17.005118° N, 53.743272° E
Remarks: Displays distinct square seen elsewhere at PB Killi and PB Bole.

Location: Patrol Base Kumasi (Site #1)
Coordinates: 17.029440° N, 53.727919° E
Remarks: Site displays several distinct "diamond ring" formations, which are artillery pits, consistent with Gardiner's map indicating that Kumasi was an artillery point. Located directly northwest of PB Kumasi Site #2.

Location: Patrol Base Kumasi (Site #2)
Coordinates: 17.028299° N, 53.731781° E
Remarks: Possesses features more indicative of a fortified perimeter than accompanying site. Located directly southeast of PB Kumasi Site #1.

Location: Patrol Base Bole
Coordinates: 17.063200° N, 53.680573° E
Remarks: Displays distinct square seen elsewhere at PB Killi and PB Reef, as well as apparent fortified perimeter markings similar to PB Ashawq and PB Kumasi Site #2.

Location: Patrol Base Bole (Satellite)
Coordinates: 17.063200° N, 53.680573° E
Remarks: Possibly a satellite observation post of PB Bole.

Location: Patrol Base Oven
Coordinates: 17.189088° N, 53.631102° E
Remarks: Located by following markings of apparent Hornbeam Line remnants northward from site of PB Bole.

By using Google Earth, or Wikimapia's Google Satellite and Bing Satellite options, you can see the actual "line" of the Hornbeam Line. Before I left Scotland, I had the opportunity to meet for a couple of hours with retired Royal Marines Brigadier Ian Gardiner, a Dhofar veteran and author of In the Service of the Sultan, and I showed him a slide deck I'd assembled detailing these findings. Based upon his book and our discussion, here are a few additional notes.

1) He believes that the distinctive square formations at PB Killi, PB Reef, and PB Bole were enclosures for livestock. I had originally suspected that they were helicopter landing pands, by a closer inspection of PB Kumasi Site #1 using Google Earth (pictured) revealed three helicopter pads. I also found similar helipads at this site further to the west, which I believe to be one of the positions from the Imperial Iranian Task Force's Damavand Line.

2) Brigadier Gardiner informed me that there were "two Kumasis". He confirmed that the "diamond ring" formations are the remnants of artillery pits. It looks like one of the sites was the main patrol base, and the adjacent position was the gunnery section.

3) In both his book and during our conversation, Brigadier Gardiner mentioned that the line is probably still dangerous since various factors ranging from weather, to animals, to insurgents tended to relocate the land mines that gave the Hornbeam Line its teeth. He mentions in his book that much of the barbed wire has been repurposed by the locals for their own animal enclosures.

A little bit of work on Google Earth following Operation Irene was eye-opening. It showed me just how steep some of those slopes are, as well as how deceptive some of the overhead visuals are. There were several positions that looked to me like they were down in depressions or gullies, when they're actually all on pretty high ground.

My efforts will continue as I have time. I'd like to find the rest of the Damavand Line, and some other terrain features.