Tuesday, November 26, 2013

Considering Iranian-American Relations

As the politicians and pundits discuss the recent nuclear deal with Iran, I thought I'd put together a few resources for anyone who's interested in a crash course on post-Revolutionary Iranian-American relations. People tend to have heard of Operation Ajax, in which American and British operatives facilitated a coup d'état against Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadegh after he began nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. People have a vague idea of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and they know who Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Shah Reza Pahlavi were. (Oddly enough, as Daniel J. Flynn notes in his book A Conservative History of the American Left, Khomeini's accession was initially lauded by Western elites as a harbinger of Iranian liberalization and democratic reform that ultimately failed to materialize.) Some are also familiar with the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing. However, there are a lot of good resources out there about the very difficult relationship between Iran and the West, and particularly America, since 1979.

The best places to start are a 2009 BBC documentary series entitled "Iran and the West" (parts 1, 2, and 3), and a 2013 New Yorker article entitled The Shadow Commander. In the latter article, author Dexter Filkins focuses his narrative on Major General Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps' Quds Force - the Iranian corollary to the CIA's Special Activities Division. If you ignore everything else, you ought to invest some time in those four items. Beyond these resources, what follows are some topical sections on various aspects of Western-Iranian relations since 1979.

* * *

The Iran-Iraq War

Mark Bowden's Guests of the Ayatollah provides some of the best discussion of the Iran Hostage Crisis and the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War that I've ever read. Before I go into detail, here's a brief, oversimplified synopsis of the Iran-Iraq War and its aftermath.

For a variety of reasons, Iraq invaded Iran in September of 1980. The war involved various offensives, but was essentially an eight year stalemate that revisited many of the tactics and conditions of the First World War in a Middle Eastern venue. Alliances shifted, with various outside actors supplying both belligerents at various times (notably in, but not limited to, the Iran-Contra affair). For the most part, the West supported Iraq because although Iraq was a Soviet client state, Iran was considered the greater strategic threat - particularly after the aforementioned Iran Hostage Crisis. Eventually, the stalemate and Iranian tactics exhausted the Iraqi economy, and although the Gulf monarchies disliked the Hussein regime, they also considered Iran to be the greater threat. The Gulf states began propping up the Iraqi economy by transporting Iraqi oil out of the Gulf, at which point the Iranians began to attack GCC tankers with mines, at which point the United States got involved by re-flagging tankers as American ships and escorting them with U.S. Navy vessels. Iran continued mining American ships, which resulted in American retaliation (discussed below). With both nations exhausted, the war ended in an effective draw in August of 1988. At this point, the Hussein regime demanded economic assistance from the GCC, who declined; Hussein also accused Kuwait of slant-drilling. In 1990, Iraq responded to the GCC by invading and annexing Kuwait (which had traditionally been part of the Ottoman wilayat of Basra) and attacking Saudi Arabia. After months of failed diplomacy, Iraqi forces were forcibly expelled from Kuwait in early 1991 by an American-led, United Nations-mandated coalition. Beyond the prior confrontations with American forces, Iranian leaders witnessed the American-led coalition doing to Iraq in a matter of days what they themselves had failed to do in a matter of years. This is widely believed to be a prevailing motivator for Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Though little-known to Americans, post-Revolution American-Iranian relations deteriorated further as a result of the The Tanker War, notable elements of which were Operation Earnest Will, Operation Prime Chance, Operation Eager Glacier, Operation Nimble Archer, and Operation Praying Mantis. The last of these was a direct response to the Iranian mine strike on USS Samuel B. Roberts. Relations were further complicated by the accidental American shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 by USS Vincennes.

Support to Insurgent and Terrorist Groups

Beyond its prominent role operating Hezbollah in Lebanon and elsewhere, and supporting other groups such as Hamas, Iran's role in and relating to Afghanistan and Iraq have been complex. As noted by Dexter Filkins in the article linked above, Iran nearly went to war with Afghanistan prior to 9/11, and Iranian and Western forces cooperated in Afghanistan against the Taliban in 2001 and early 2002.

  • Iran helped overthrow Taliban, candidate says
  • Ismail Khan, Herat and Iranian Influence
  • Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Iranian Special Forces Reportedly Fight Alongside US in Battle for Herat

    However, after relations deteriorated once more, the Iranians subsequently appear to have provided some support to both the Taliban and al Qaeda. This has apparently involved providing al Qaeda with logistical assistance and safe havens, and possibly supplying weapons to the Taliban.

  • BBC Documentary: The Afghan Arms Bazaar
  • State Department: Iran Supports Al Qaeda, Taliban
  • Gates: Iran’s support for Taliban ‘limited’
  • Hague fury as 'Iranian arms' bound for Taliban seized
  • Iran Hedges its Bets in Afghanistan
  • State Department: Iran supports Taliban, Iraqi militants
  • Al Qaeda in Iran
  • Strange bedfellows - Iran and al Qaeda
  • Analysis: Spinning Iran and al Qaeda, part 1
  • Analysis: Spinning Iran and al Qaeda, part 2

    The Iran/al Qaeda relationship has been tenuous, and has backfired upon both Iran and al Qaeda at times. The article about Qassem Suleimani notes that initial cooperation with al Qaeda in Iraq eventually collapsed, fueling the Sunni/Shiite sectarian war that took place over the course of several years. Iran supplied specialized weapons to Shiite insurgents...

  • U.S. Sees New Weapon In Iraq: Iranian EFPs
  • Iranian sniper rifles in the hands of Iraqi insurgents
  • Report: High-Tech Austrian Rifles Sold to Iran Turning Up in Hands of Iraqi Insurgents
  • Iraqi insurgents using Austrian rifles from Iran

    ... and simultaneously kept several members of Osama bin laden's family in Iran.

  • Osama bin Laden's family missing since 9/11 attacks found living in secret compound in Iran
  • Osama bin Ladens family stranded in Iran, son says

    There are a couple of other articles about Iran and afghanistan that are worth reading:

  • Freewheeling Herat Fearful of US Pullout
  • Iran reopens Afghan consulate after protests

    Iran and the Gulf

    I could probably write a book on recent relations between Iran and its relations with the various neighbors. Having already skirted around the situation vis a vis Iraq, here are a few articles discussing recent interaction, mostly adversarial, between Iran and Bahrain, the only Shiite-majority GCC member...

  • Bahrain's King: Foreign plot to destabilize country foiled
  • Bahrain tensions a trigger for Gulf turmoil
  • Iran told to keep out of Saudi-Bahrain affairs
  • Bahrain Jails Three Iran 'spies'

    ... Qatar and the United Arab Emirates...

  • Iran brushes off UAE call for talks on Gulf islands
  • Qatar, UAE request $7.6 billion in missile defense: U.S.
  • Qatar and UAE look to bolster defence systems
  • Qatar, UAE request $7.6 bn in missile defense: US

    ... Kuwait...

  • Kuwait condemns three to death in Iran spy ring
  • Kuwait: Iran involved in spy ring
  • Iran rejects Kuwait spy cell allegation
  • Kuwait Said To Bust Spy Ring
  • Govt should monitor Syrian intel activities
  • Lot Of Spy Networks Using Kuwait As A Transit Point
  • 'Security, stability of Kuwait at risk' - 'Foreign hands at work'

    ... Oman (whose relations with Iran remain the closest of the Gulf nations due to a variety of factors specific to Oman)...

  • US official lauds Oman’s peace efforts in region
  • Oman Navigates Between Iran and Arab Nations
  • Oman-Iran Foreign Relations
  • As Tension Between Iran and the West Escalates, Keep Oman in Mind
  • Former Iranian diplomat freed by UK arrives in Oman
  • Oman secures release of Iranian diplomat
  • GCC states slam Iran interference in region
  • GCC lashes out at Iran, urges Syria transition
  • Iran-Oman Joint Military Committee Wraps Up Work in Tehran
  • Iran, Oman discuss military ties
  • Iran, Oman commanders meet on military cooperation
  • Iran-Oman military begins joint five-day meet in Muscat
  • Iran, Oman to hold new joint naval drills
  • Iran, Oman Ink Agreement on Defensive Cooperation
  • Cooperation key to regional security: Iran
  • Iran, Oman Underline Boosting Military Cooperation
  • Iran, Oman to Hold Joint Drills in Winter

    ... and Saudi Arabia.

  • Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria
  • Qatar crosses the Syrian Rubicon: £63m to buy weapons for the rebels
  • Taliban Opening Qatar Office, and Maybe Door to Talks
  • Syria crisis: Qatar handing embassy over to opposition
  • Qatar to give Syria opposition embassy
  • The New Cold War
  • Man shot dead as police clash with Shiites in Saudi Arabia
  • Shia Days of Rage
  • To Stop Iran, Get a New Saudi King

    The West is frequently criticized for its close relations with the GCC's authoritarian regimes. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations between the West and the GCC states solidified due to the mutually adversarial relationships between Iran and both parties. (This was later strengthened by distrust of Iraq, but that's another topic for another day.) People tend to focus on Iran's nuclear program with respect to its actual potential destructive capacity and range. While these concerns are legitimate, Iran's tendency to eschew direct confrontation in favor of more covert, irregular methods demonstrates that the underlying concern should be how a potential Iranian nuclear capability might be used to advance Iranian political objectives in the region. One major concern is that an Iranian nuclear capability would compel the Saudis, and potentially the Egyptians and the Turks, to pursue their own nuclear programs in order to deter Iran's influence. (I'm working on an upcoming post that will focus specifically on this issue.)

    American Relationships with Dissident Groups

    While in no way claiming any moral equivalence between Iranian support for terrorist groups, and American support for the following groups, it's worth noting that Iranian distrust of the West typically takes Western support for such dissident groups into account. (There's a sort of chicken/egg dichotomy that's worth noting on that one.) There have been suggestions of covert Western support to the Balochi insurgent group known as Jundallah, formerly led by the late Abdolmalek Rigi...

  • Car Bombing in Iran Kills 11, Wounds 31 Elite Revolutionary Guards
  • Iranian bombing 'kills 11 people'
  • Iran blast points to ethnic tensions
  • Bomb kills 11 on military bus in Iran
  • Clashes reported in Iranian city
  • 2nd blast in 3 days hits Iranian city
  • Order restored after blast at girls school in Iran
  • ABC News Exclusive: The Secret War Against Iran

    ... and Western states have openly worked with the Mojehedin e Khalq (People's Mujahideen of Iran), a leftist group that worked with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and subsequently took asylum in Iraq at Camp Ashraf until relatively recently.

  • People's Mujahedin of Iran
  • U.S. protects Iranian opposition group in Iraq
  • Global Security: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
  • Analysis: Is MeK still a terrorist group?
  • UK's 'terror' ban appeal denied
  • Iranian group in UK terror win

    * * *

    There's obviously a lot of information to go through, and it could easily take a person days or even weeks to try and read or process it all. These items are barely scratching the surface of these issues. The relationship is complicated, it's always been complicated, and it will remain complicated. People like things to be wrapped up neatly and tidily - we're conditioned by books, movies, and television to expect that. In truth, Western States have strategic goals that compete directly with those of post-Revolutionary Iran. It's difficult for any expert to identify significant opportunities for compromise and cooperation, or to foresee a future in which those strategic goals will overlap. As such, and despite pronouncements and celebration of deals over Iran's nuclear program - and judging from the nightly rhetoric on Iran's Voice of Justice broadcasts - the underlying conflict between Iran and the West will continue into the foreseeable future.
  • Friday, November 22, 2013

    The Post-Google Reader Blues

    Every now and again, I hit news burnout. I hit the wall earlier this year and haven't been regularly reading the news for the last few months. While I was on my news hiatus, we as a society lost Google Reader. I've attempted on several occasions to get Feedly to work, and finally got it sorted out on Friday morning. I made a little effort to use Pulse on my Kindle Fire, but it's fairly tedious to use, so I haven't taken to it like I did to Google Reader.

    As I was sorting Feedly out, I went to look at a blog I used to enjoy, Abu Muqawama. The author, Andrew Exum, took a leave of absence a little over a year ago, and left the blog to a couple of long-term guest authors. While reviewing my old feeds, I discovered not only that Exum has discontinued the blog, but that it's taken less than a month for the Center for a New American Security to straight up delete it, in its entirety. I'm actually rather upset, because there are several of Exum's posts that I would have copied and saved for my own purposes. There are also rumblings that the Ink Spots blog has gone defunct, though it's at least still present.

    At any rate, something else that I've come up with, using my mad HTML editing skills, is my own local HTML file (built from the OPML file I exported from Google Reader) that organizes my feeds. It's much lower tech than Google Reader, Feedly, or Pulse, but it has the virtue of being a touch more reliable than free services (or blogs) that can disappear, even without any sort of notice.

    Just in case you're curious what's currently in my feed, have a look:

    General News
    Site; RSS: BBC News - NE Scotland, Orkney & Shetland
    Site; RSS: CNN.com - WORLD
    Site; RSS: Guardian World News
    Middle East News
    Site; RSS: al Arabiya English - Middle East
    Site; RSS: al Jazeera English
    Site; RSS: Arab Times
    Site; RSS: BBC News - Middle East
    Site; RSS: CNN.com - WORLD/Middle East
    Site; RSS: The Economist: Middle East and Africa
    Site; RSS: Kuwait Times
    Site; RSS: Memri Latest Reports
    Site; RSS: Muscat Daily Oman News
    Site; RSS: Oman Observer
    Site; RSS: Oman Tribune
    Site; RSS: Site Intelligence Group - Jihadist News
    Site; RSS: Times Of Oman
    Global Security News
    Site; RSS: 1913 Intel
    Site; RSS: Abu Muqawama
    Site; RSS: CNN Security Clearance
    Site; RSS: CSIS: Event Feed
    Site; RSS: CSIS: Publication Feed
    Site; RSS: FAS Strategic Security Blog
    Site; RSS: Foreign Affairs
    Site; RSS: Foreign Policy
    Site; RSS: Guardian: Julian Borger's global security blog
    Site; RSS: Ink Spots
    Site; RSS: Kevin Hanrahan
    Site; RSS: Michael J. Totten's blog
    Site; RSS: Michael Totten
    Site; RSS: Michael Yon - Online Magazine
    Site; RSS: Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict
    Site; RSS: Small Wars Journal
    Site; RSS: Spacewar.com
    Site; RSS: The Long War Journal (Site-Wide)
    Site; RSS: Wired.com Danger Room
    Site; RSS: Wired.com Threat Level
    Site; RSS: Understanding War
    Site; RSS: War Is Boring
    Podcasts
    Site; RSS: BBC Documentaries
    Site; RSS: BBC Global News
    Site; RSS: BBC Kermode and Mayo's Film Reviews
    Site; RSS: BBC Newshour
    Site; RSS: BBC Xtra Arabic
    Site; RSS: The Faroe Islands Podcast
    Site; RSS: Fit for Duty
    Site; RSS: The Heritage Foundation - Past Events
    Site; RSS: The History Chicks
    Site; RSS: KSL Nightside Project
    Site; RSS: The Michael Medved Show
    Site; RSS: NASACast Audio
    Site; RSS: Orkney Talking Newspaper
    Site; RSS: Prime Minister's Questions
    Site; RSS: The Sporkful
    Site; RSS: War Studies' Podcast
    Webcomics
    Site; RSS: AmazingSuperPowers
    Site; RSS: Ctrl+Alt+Del
    Site; RSS: Cyanide and Happiness
    Site; RSS: Filibuster Cartoons
    Site; RSS: Pearls Before Swine
    Site; RSS: Penny Arcade
    Site; RSS: Real Life Comics
    Site; RSS: Romantically Apocalyptic
    Site; RSS: Terminal Lance
    Site; RSS: Wondermark
    Site; RSS: xkcd.com
    Pictures
    Site; RSS: Astronomy Picture of the Day
    Site; RSS: Uploads from Callum McKain
    Site; RSS: Uploads from chimpaction
    Site; RSS: Uploads from Defence Images
    Site; RSS: Uploads from Official U.S. Navy Imagery
    Site; RSS: Uploads from the Oregon Military Department
    Site; RSS: Uploads from Orkneyjar
    Site; RSS: Uploads from The Central Intelligence Agency
    Site; RSS: Uploads from The United States Army
    Site; RSS: Uploads from United States Marine Corps
    General Interest
    Site; RSS: McSweeney's
    Site; RSS: Musings from a Stonehead

    You know what they say: knowledge is power.

    Sunday, November 3, 2013

    More Thoughts on Middle Eastern Borders


    A few days ago, I posted my thoughts about this excellent article, which discusses the issue of Middle Eastern borders. As I've been doing some research to follow on from my dissertation, I remembered a recent graphic I'd seen in another article, and looked it up to share: "How 5 Countries Could Become 14"; the article is titled "Imagining a Remapped Middle East". The second article is sort of ridiculous for a number of reasons.

    There's sort of a prevailing view, generally attributed to President Woodrow Wilson, that the solution to international conflicts is often to carve terrain up into independent states handed off primarily to independent ethnic groups. This is often pejoratively called "Balkanization", inspired by the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia into a sort of adversarial neighborhood of smaller, independent states. As a United States Senator, Vice President Biden even advocated for a "soft partition" - de facto independence - for Iraq's three major population groups. That original article points out some of the big problems with that concept, one of which is stated as follows:
    "At best, creating more countries would have just meant more borders to fight over, while fewer large countries would have turned regular wars into civil ones."
    To be fair, the New York Times article/graphic is attempting to report on what the author thinks might happen in the foreseeable future, rather than advocating for it. Even so, author Robin Wright (who's associated with the United States Institute of Peace and the Wilson Center - what did I say earlier about President Wilson's philosophy?) doesn't appear to have quite the grasp of history or politics that Nick Danforth (author of the first article) does. While I'd be tempted to give her the benefit of the doubt by presuming that she wasn't involved in the actual composition of the graphic, she unfortunately uses the phrases "Sunnistan" and "Shiitestan", which suggests that the graphic's use of the terms "Wahhabistan" and "Alawitestan" were also inspired by the author. Beyond the obvious problems with this idea that Nick Danforth discussed in that first article, the use of the "-stan" suffix. There's a reason why the only region in the quasi-Arab world whose name ends in "-stan" is "Kurdistan": because "-stan" is Indo-Persian, not Arabic, hence the countries of "Greater Persia" (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, et. al.) carrying that suffix. The fact that Ms. Wright uses this term betrays an ignorance of the region about which she's writing.

    The whole thing reminds me of a challenge I had while working in the Middle East. In mid-February 2011, a marginalized portion of Kuwait's population began holding sporadic demonstrations in several locations in and around Kuwait City, and I was responsible for briefing my organization's leaders on these protests. This required me to educate them on the fact that there was, in fact, a difference between a "bidun/بدون‎", meaning "without nationality" - these were the folks who were protesting - and a "bedouin/بَدَوِي", meaning "nomad/wanderer". I found that despite having only recently arrived in the reason, I was very nearly the only person in the entire organization - some of these folks having been there for years who knew that there was a distinction.

    The fact that more than a decade after 9/11, more than two decades after the Gulf War, more than three decades after the Islamic Revolution, the majority of military leaders and commentators on international affairs remain this clueless about fairly basic aspects of Middle Eastern affairs is pretty upsetting. It's unfortunate that an article this misinformed was actually published in the New York Times, which is meant to be America's journal of record.

    Perhaps even more disconcerting is that this Wilsonian concept of partition and Balkanization is still considered a viable solution to international challenges. It's one of the reasons why I'm so skeptical about the prospect of Scotland becoming an independent state, as I've discussed elsewhere. This isn't to say that unification and integration are panaceas for those same challenges, but where integration is possible, it has tended to produce better results than the alternative. Some examples of this have been the Korean Peninsula, Yemen, and South Sudan, where fragmentation has produced adverse results; and Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Germany, where unification has produced positive results. (I personally think that there's a case to be made for taking pieces of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to make an independent Balochistan and an independent Pashtunistan, but that's another discussion entirely.) Whenever possible, even when it's challenging, national and international risks tend to be better managed by working in concert than by working independently.