Multiple Items: Gulf Security and Nuclear Issues

My last two posts (Iranian Nuclear Issues and Sensitive Information Protection and Thoughts on Computer Network Defense) were originally meant to be a single post covering a couple of independent issues in short succession. I failed at that goal. I'm going to attempt it again today with even more topics, all related to strategy and international security.

I've been seeing a number of articles about the Kuwaiti citizen body's anxiety over a new GCC security accord. (‘GCC Pact In Harmony With Kuwaiti Laws’; Treaty will Ensure Coordination Among Security Agencies) One of the big arguments appears to be that the new accord conflicts with the Kuwaiti constitution. Saudi Arabia is the proverbial "first among equals" in the GCC, and it's entirely possible that the Kuwaitis are reticent after the 2011 Saudi/GCC security force deployment to Bahrain (more on that here.) In late 2012, the GCC members also agreed to unify members' military forces under a single command. I haven't had a chance to drill down further into this issue, so if I find something else of note, I'll share it.

Another item I've been seeing pop up recently is concern about GCC nationals returning from fighting in Syria. (MP warns of Syria fighters) The Kuwaitis have been concerned about this for a while now ; like the Iraq War before it, the Syrian civil war has become a proxy conflict between the Sunni and Shia sects. The Iranians have supported the Syrian Alawite regime with funding, equipment, advisors, and fighters; meanwhle, several Gulf states (notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar) have supported Sunni rebel groups with weapons, funding, and relief supplies. I read an article last week, again out of Kuwait, that said that Saudi King Abdullah has issued a decree requiring the incarceration of Saudis who fight in or support conflicts abroad. The Saudis had some previous experience with these issues as the primary sponsors of the Arab Afghans, the most famous of whom was Osama bin Laden. The Gulf States walk a thin line between pursuing their strategic agenda (for which their military forces are seldom an appropriate option), and balancing that strategic agenda with domestic security considerations.

Last week, I talked about a February 2013 CNAS paper claiming that the Saudis are unlikely to pursue a domestic nuclear program (though I thought their case undermined their actual thesis - I was more convinced of potential Saudi nuclear ambitions after reading the report). I also cited a BBC article which claimed that the Saudis would pursue a nuclear option if Iran got one. The National Journal published an article on Friday which claims that the Saudis are investigating a uranium enrichment program. Rhetoric about Iran's nuclear program usually focuses on the threat to either America or Israel; but in my mind, the big risk from a notional Iranian nuclear weapons capability is that it would spark a de facto arms race in which other nations, notably the Saudis but also Egypt and possibly Turkey, would pursue their own nuclear weapons capabilities. At that point, one gets into the question of adequate arms controls, to include command and control (C2). Those concerns are often overlooked by the commentariat, but they're of potentially greater concern than the direct risks of upsetting the present nuclear status quo.

Continuing with the discussion of nuclear issues, there are two items of note to share today. The first is disappointing: Red Cross to the World: Eliminate Nuclear Weapons ‘Once and For All’; Group says a relief operation for a nuke attack would be virtually impossible:

“The humanitarian consequences following a nuclear explosion would cause unprecedented devastation,” said Fernando Suinaga, Mexican Red Cross president and member of the Movement in Nayarit. “Any rescue or relief operation undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for those affected would be virtually impossible.”

Having taken a postgraduate course in Strategic Nuclear Doctrine, arguments such as these are always frustrating because they're generally made in ignorance of both history and doctrine. Nuclear weapons have saved the Red Cross from impossible humanitarian crises precisely because their potential impact was and is so horrific as to deter their use by a variety of potential belligerents. More encouraging is a new podcast from War on the Rocks in which the participants discuss contemporary nuclear doctrine. It's well worth the listen, and it's introduced me to a new podcast series on which I'll have to catch up.

And finally, also from WOTR, I'm quite excited to read Iran History, and Strategy by Analogy by Lawrence Freedman. (This despite the fact that Freedman wrote what may be the most convoluted book I've ever read.)

As always, more to come soon.