Selections from Clausewitz, Part 5

It's time for the latest installment of my commentaries on Carl von Clausewitz's On War. Clausewitz's first three chapters are fairly lengthy. By contrast, the next five chapters are pretty brief.

"A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give. The law of probability must be his guide.
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter VI: Information in War

I've spoken previously, repeatedly, about how Clausewitz's writings relate to the "Revolution in Military Affairs"/"Military Transformation", so I'll defer to my previous comments.

"AS long as we have no personal knowledge of war, we cannot conceive where those difficulties lie of which so much is said, and what that genius, and those extraordinary mental powers required in a general have really to do. All appears so simple, all the requisite branches of knowledge appear so plain, all the combinations so unimportant, that, in comparison with them, the easiest problem in higher mathematics impresses us with a certain scientific dignity. But if we have seen war, all becomes intelligible; and still, after all, it is extremely difficult to describe what it is which brings about this change, to specify this invisible and completely efficient Factor."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter VII: Friction in War

In Book I Chapter I, Clausewitz describes what has been called "Clausewitz's Social Trinity" of the people, the general and his army, and the government. I wanted to highlight the above-quoted passage because I think it identifies three interesting quandaries that emerge from that trinity and from the observation Clausewitz is making here. Civilian policy-makers and the public at large are often quick to opine about the military, or about how various wars are conducted; however, few are more than vaguely familiar with topics at hand. This ignorance is mitigated to some degree by embedded journalists, who were less prevalent than in Clausewitz's time, but that introduces questions about the media establishment that aren't germane to the topic of strategy. This ignorance can cut both ways, either with unwarranted lenience, or with unwarranted criticality.

Another challenge, which I'll discuss in more detail in the next installment of my Clausewitz commentaries, is the actual competence of the generals in question. This goes more directly to what Clausewitz is describing: on the one hand, he's advocating that some of his readers refrain from judging commanders; but on the other, he's acknowledging that becoming a competent general is extremely difficult. I'm reminded of another item I recently read which identifies that the Chinese military, to include China's generals, possess negligible experience in actual warfighting, and that this will be an issue should China try to assert itself militarily in the coming years. Conversely, I've been rather disappointed with the performance of many American generals in recent years, particularly Generals George Casey and Stanley McChrystal. Most people have never heard of General Casey, although he commanded the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) before General Petraeus, and was subsequently promoted to become the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, making him America's top-ranking soldier at the time. For a variety of reasons I won't discuss here, I was convinced fairly early on that General McChrystal, who was heralded by many in the commentariat as exactly the sort of leader America needed to win in Afghanistan, had fundamentally misread the Afghan situation and made a series of critically flawed decisions as a result. Another recent article was fairly supportive of McChrystal's approach, which - in my opinion, at least - reinforces my aforementioned views of unwarranted lenience with generals as informed by my reading of Clausewitz.

"Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter VII: Friction in War

I have nothing to add to this quote. It's exquisite.

"Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium. Just as a man in water is unable to perform with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement, that of walking, so in war, with ordinary powers, one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity. This is the reason that the correct theorist is like a swimming master, who teaches on dry land movements which are required in the water, which must appear grotesque and ludicrous to those who forget about the water. This is also why theorists, who have never plunged in themselves, or who cannot deduce any generalities from their experience, are unpractical and even absurd, because they only teach what every one knows — how to walk."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter VII: Friction in War

I'll touch on this again in the next installment, but I wanted to discuss one aspect of it here. The line between theorist and practitioner is a very difficult line to ride, and I'm not sure that I entirely agree with the Father of Strategy on this observation, especially since I can think of recent cases on both sides of the argument. I know of one such theorist, whose name I'll withhold, who has served as an official in the Obama Administration and who now occupies a very influential post in a private think tank, and despite very impressive credentials, I have yet to see or hear anything of value or merit from the individual in question. Conversely, some of history's greatest strategists - one good example being nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter - never served a day in uniform. (Other examples of great strategists with minimal military experience are Herman Kahn, Bernard Brodie, and Robert Gates.) Contrasting with both examples would be those military leaders whose generalship results in utter failure. There may be some room to massage this particular passage to account for changes in the "grammar" of war since Clausewitz's day, but on its face, I'm reticent to dismiss the potential for civilians to contribute greatly to matters of defense and warfare simply because they have not themselves come under hostile fire. Again, more on this to come.

"Certainly, he is not the best general in whose mind it assumes the greatest dimensions, who is the most overawed by it (this includes that class of over-anxious generals, of whom there are so many amongst the experienced); but a general must be aware of it that he may overcome it, where that is possible; and that he may not expect a degree of precision in results which is impossible on account of this very friction."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter VII: Friction in War

Essentially, this mirrors the adage from the lesser of the great military theorists, Sun Tzu, who wrote of the importance of knowing both oneself and the enemy. I think this passage also speaks to the importance of having well-rounded generals, familiar not merely with the art of war, but also with a variety of other arts and sciences. There's an active debate in American military circles (link, link, link) as to how well the American military, and particularly the U.S. Army, is doing at achieving that balance. The next installment will be a special edition focusing on a specific topic. Stay tuned.