Selections from Clausewitz, Part 2

About a month ago, I posted the first in a series of selections from my ongoing reading of On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Here's the second installment.

"Lastly, even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered state often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations. How much this also must modify the degree of tension and the vigour of the efforts made is evident in itself."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, section 9

We like to think of events - even wars - as finalities. In reality, history continues to unfold, and whether by way of force or through other means, nations will continue to proact and react based upon what Thucydides codified as their "fear, honor, and interest." History is rife with case studies in which nations which have been defeated on the battlefield have continued to react upon their fears, safeguard their honor, and pursue their interests.

"It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate, in fact, a perfect explosion."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, section 11

I read this passage, and immediately thought, "First World War".

"But there is still another cause which may stop action in war, that is an incomplete view of the situation. Each commander can only fully know his own position; that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports, which are uncertain; he may, therefore, form a wrong judgment with respect to it upon data of this description, and, in consequence of that error, he may suppose that the initiative is properly with his adversary when it is really with himself. This want of perfect insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely action as untimely inaction, and so it would in itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in war. Still, it must always be regarded as one of the natural causes which may bring action in war to a standstill without involving a contradiction. But if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents too high than too low, because it lies in human nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight into facts in general must contribute very much to stop action in war, and to modify the principle of action."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, section 18

Intelligence is a critical and difficult aspect of warfare. One could read this passage and consider how significantly the intelligence estimates about Iraq overestimated its military strength. One could also make some observations about the Cold War "missile gap", or other aspects of deterrence aided by deception. Thus far, my readings haven't covered the Clausewitzian concepts of "friction" or the "fog of war", but this passage certainly alludes to them.

"We see therefore how from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, no where finds any sure basis in the calculations in the art of war; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes war of all branches of human activity the most like a game of cards."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, section 21

I remember hearing General James Mattis, the legendary "Warrior Monk", speak about the shortfalls of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and other "Military Transformation"/"Revolution in Military Affairs" programs that were meant to cut through the aforementioned "fog of war" by leveraging modern computing power to process unprecedented volumes of information (typically categorized under the "PMESII" rubric: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information systems). General Mattis, one of the few competent strategists to grace the ranks of Flag/General Officers in recent years, circulated a much-discussed memorandum (mentioned in that previous post) in 2008 in which he outlined his concerns with this approach and essentially pulled the plug on further development of EBO. As I was reading the passage from Clausewitz, this passage jumped out at me as being directly relevant to the DoD's abortive efforts to dominate the post-Cold War battlefield by performing quantitative analysis upon incomprehensible volumes of intelligence data. Given the outcome of these efforts, it would seem that the late father of strategy had the last laugh.

More to come.