Selections from Clausewitz, Part 4

In the third chapter of his first book, the Father of Strategy shifts his focus to matters of what we would today call psychology. This is to say, he discusses some of the more human elements of war, warfare, and generalship.

"The fewer the employment followed by a nation, the more that of arms predominates, so much the more prevalent military genius must also be found. But this merely applies to its prevalence, by no means to its degree, for that depends on the general state of intellectual culture in the country. If we look at a wild, warlike race, then we find a warlike spirit in individuals much more common than in a civilised people; for in the former almost every warrior possesses it; whilst in the civilised, whole masses are only carried away by it from necessity, never by inclination. But amongst uncivilised people we never find a really great general, and very seldom what we can properly call a military genius, because that requires a development of the intelligent powers which cannot be found in an uncivilised state."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter III

Having spent a year of my life studying strategy, it should come as no surprise that I'm an advocate for strategic thinking. The U.S. Army, which is America's "senior service" and tends to dominate overall defense operations, has been criticized for being anti-intellectual, and I'm increasingly convinced that most career officers don't learn strategy or really even understand what it entails - they learn tactics as cadets and junior officers, and campaigning as field grade officers. It's not a comprehensive phenomenon, but it's systemic and institutionalized. This quandary seems to extend in large part from the way the Army selects and promotes its officer corps; as a commenter on a recent article at War on the Rocks noted (I've truncated it a bit): "[T]actical proficiency does not necessarily guarantee strategic proficiency... there are some gifted tacticians in the officer ranks who are not necessarily suited to strategy... we may be weeding out excellent strategists before they are afforded a chance to show their abilities." I could point to a number of illustrative examples of this trend. I actually think that the American military, primarily the Army, is representative of the proverbial "middle" in the Father of Strategy's example, between the unstrategic, chaotic bezerkers of ISIS/DAESH on the one hand, and America's insular and militarily disengaged European allies on the other. That sweet spot between a sufficiently martial society and the sort of intellectual culture which produces a "great general" or a "military genius" is tough to suss out.

"A common understanding may, at one time, perhaps hit upon this truth by accident: an extraordinary courage, at another time, may compensate for the want of this tact: but in the majority of cases the average result will always bring to light the deficient understanding."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter III

This observation by the Father of Strategy could be applied to just about anything. To some degree, all human exploits, not the least of these being warfare, are governed by pure, dumb luck. However, patterns of success reveal sufficient understanding, while patterns of failure reveal deficient understanding.

"Mere intelligence is still not courage, for we often see the cleverest people devoid of resolution. The mind must, therefore, first awaken the feeling of courage, and then be guided and supported by it, because in momentary emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than his thoughts."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter III

I'm reminded of the training that modern soldiers, and particularly the Marines, who are conditioned in recruit training and again in the Schools of Infantry to follow direction from their junior leaders almost instinctively. Clausewitz's observation highlights the critical confluence of intellect and courage.

"We believe, therefore, that resolution is indebted to a special direction of the mind for its existence, a direction which belongs to a strong head, rather than to a brilliant one. In corroboration of this genealogy of resolution we may add that there have been many instances of men who have shown the greatest resolution in an inferior rank, and have lost it in a higher position. While on the one hand they are obliged to resolve, on the other they see the dangers of a wrong decision, and as they are surrounded with things new to them, their understanding loses its original force, and they become only the more timid the more they become aware of the danger of the irresolution into which they have fallen, and the more they have formerly been in the habit of acting on the spur of the moment."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter III

I didn't originally save this passage as I was reading through the third chapter of On War, but I kept thinking about it and decided to include it. It's such a fascination observation of how bold young leaders are, and how that boldness is adulterated - for better and for worse - by age and experience. This phenomenon speaks to life in general, but particularly for the leadership and administration of armed force in the pursuit of political ends.

"To conduct a whole war, or its great acts, which we call campaigns, to a successful termination, there must be an intimate knowledge of state policy in its higher relations. The conduct of the war, and the policy of the State, here coincide; and the general becomes, at the same time, the statesman."

[...]

"In order that the reader may appreciate all that must be comprehended and judged of correctly at a glance by a general, we refer to the first chapter. We say, the general becomes a statesman, but he must not cease to be the general. He takes into view all the relations of the State on the one hand; on the other he must know exactly what he can do with the means at his disposal."
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter III

I'll cover this concept in more detail in a subsequent edition, but I wanted to highlight its instance here. We tend to think of generals as senior managers of the use of armed force. The truly great generals, however - which is to say, the successful ones - are intimately acquainted with all of the instruments of national power, what their comparative strengths and limitations are, and how best to orchestrate them in order to achieve political ends as directed by policy-makers.

More to come.