Four Things to Remember About the Iranian Nuclear Negotiations

The Iranian nuclear negotiations are big news at the moment. Never fear, for I'm here to cut through the bluster with four things you should know about what's going on. This, ladies and gentlemen, is a very special Iranian Nuclear Negotiations Thoughts for Today:

1. Iran doesn't want to stage a nuclear attack on Israel, or the United States, or anyone, really.

A lot of the concern about Iran revolves around a fear that they'll try to bomb Israel and "exterminate the Jews". Iran has a lot of vitriolic rhetoric about Israel, but it's all saber-rattling. For the domestic audience, the Iranian regime uses Israel as a scapegoat to justify lousy living conditions, a poor economy, and no reforms to fix anything. A lot of regimes in the Islamic world do this, and it mirrors North Korea's saber-rattling against South Korea, not to mention George Orwell's dystopian classic 1984. For the international audience, portraying itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause is meant to bolster Shiite Persian Iran's Islamic bona fides relative to Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia in a region that's majority Sunni Arab. (Turkey's Islamist government has been getting into that game recently, too.) Iran's Jews are actually some of the best-treated in the Islamic world. Actually attacking Israel with an atomic weapon would not only obliterate Iran's most convenient scapegoat, but would also negate any Islamic credibility Iran might have by destroying one of Islam's holy sites (Jerusalem/al Quds), and there's no good reason for Iran to do either.

2. The mullahs want a nuclear weapon as a deterrent against regime change.

For a variety of reasons, some understandable and some ludicrous, Iran maintains a very aggressive foreign policy directed at the United States, Israel, and its rivals in the Gulf Region. This includes varying degrees of sponsorship for such terrorist groups as Hezbollah, Hamas, al Qaeda, and the Taliban; covert terrorist attacks, such as Argentina (2012), Thailand, and Bulgaria (2012); and varying degrees of agitation in places like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain. The mullahs had a front row seat (and allegedly participated as well) when American-led coalitions invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003; and they watched in 1991 as the United States took four days to defeat the same Iraqi army that Iran spent nine years fighting to a bloody stalemate between 1980 and 1988. Those countries were invaded for precisely the kind of bellicose foreign policy that the mullahs believe to be in their regime's best interest, and recent history suggests that the best insulation against regime change is a nuclear deterrent. If the mullahs can build a deterrent capability, they believe that they can insulate themselves from regime change and continue to pursue their long-term strategic goals. In addition, the Iranian regime is unpopular, and the civilian nuclear program is the only government program that enjoys widespread public support. Thucydides characterized strategic considerations as aligning along the lines of fear, honor, and interest, and the mullahs believe that a nuclear deterrent would satisfy all three considerations.

3. Without ruling out an eleventh hour breakthrough, there's grounds for pessimism about the negotiations.

In late 2013, there was a lot of chest-thumping because the negotiators, by ceding some substantial leverage, had gotten Iran to agree to more talks. They really haven't made much progress in the intervening year and a half. Negotiations work based upon one of two factors: a confluence of common interests, or one party having enough leverage to get the other party to concede. Without getting into the modern history of arms control, two good examples are the SALT treaties of the 1970's, and the START treaties of the 1980's and early 1990's. The SALT treaties made some progress during a period of detente between the Soviet Union and the West, and ultimately fell apart because the detente fell apart when Russia responded to a weakening of American foreign policy with renewed aggression. By contrast, the START treaties were successful because they corresponded with ambitious efforts by the Reagan Administration to hamstring the Soviet Union economically, politically, and militarily. Iran was in pretty dire financial straits in late 2013. Although the Saudis have pushed oil prices down in an effort to maintain that pressure, the relaxation of sanctions aimed at keeping the regime at the negotiating table gave Iran a reprieve that has not been met with good will. SALT II fell apart when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, but the current diplomatic effort continues despite Iran's involvement in the recent overthrow of the Western-friendly government in Yemen, not to mention Iran's other disruptive efforts in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Without a bona fide overlap in strategic interest, or a significantly weakened Iranian regime, the chances for any substantive agreement seem slim.

4. Everything's not lost.

There are a few reasons for some hope. For one thing, the deal and any relaxation of most of the strictest sanctions has to get through Congress. Second, there's been a lot of agitation about how the failure to get a deal is the equivalent of wanting to bomb Iran, but that's not really accurate - there are plenty of other methods aside from military force to continue pressuring Iran. For better or for worse, the Obama Administration is probably the most permissive administration the Iranians could hope for in the near term, which could give Secretary Kerry some leverage, or potentially whomever succeeds President Obama in 2017. We Westerners are fond of thinking in terms of stories that wrap up tightly into a tight, coherent ending, but history keeps unfolding. A lot can happen in the coming days, and a lot can keep happening in the days, weeks, months, years, and decades thereafter.