Saturday, February 28, 2015

Some Stuff I Knicked from Doctrine Man

I frequently check Doctrine Man on Facebook. The articles that "DM" posts are often worthy of consideration, DM's commentary is sometimes worthy of consideration, and comments on the items and/or commentary that DM has posted ranges from thought-provoking to frustrating. Here are a few items I grabbed from DM on Wednesday, February 18th, 2015.

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Doctrine Man recently posted an article entitled Christians Flock to Iraq to Fight ISIS.

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Doctrine Man recently posted an article entitled Return of the ‘Ghost Rider’. For the first time, a decommissioned B-52 bomber has been returned to active service. Sweet!

LATE BREAKING UPDATE: Here's another link: I’ll Be Damned, These Boneyard B-52s Can Still Fly: Aged bomber gets airborne after years in the desert.
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Doctrine Man recently posted an article entitled What The Military Teaches About Bad Intel Applies To Anti-Vaxxers. It's worth reading, but it barely mentions the military at all, and does so in the following quote:
"In the military, we know better than to use rumor or unfounded suspicion as a basis for action. When a military leader feeds us obviously bad information, we call him on it."
When dealing with the military, this has not been my experience.

LATE BREAKING UPDATE: Apparently, it hasn't been anyone's experience: Lying in the military is common, Army War College study says.
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Doctrine Man recently posted an article entitled C.I.A. Is Said to Have Bought and Destroyed Iraqi Chemical Weapons. Recognizing that the intelligence that informed the decision to invade Iraq was not completely accurate, it nonetheless surprises me how many flat out falsehoods - the most common being "there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq" - get perpetuated despite mountains of evidence to the contrary, more of which is being publicly acknowledged all the time.

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Doctrine Man recently posted an article entitled Biden being Biden is the highlight of Ash Carter's swearing-in ceremony. Partisan politics aside, am I the only one who finds it almost hilariously ironic that Vice President Biden was recently very vocal, even aggressive, in denouncing sexual assault, and now it's emerging that he apparently has a reputation for being kind of a creeper? I remember listening last year to a segment on the Michael Medved Show in which Medved interviewed Ronald Kessler, author of The First Family Detail and In the President's Secret Service, and Kessler discussed the fact that Vice President Biden apparently enjoys skinny dipping despite having female agents on his Secret Service detail. Also, The Onion has done some really good comedy work relating to Vice President Biden, and it can be viewed herehere, and here.

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As awkward a note as that is to end on, that's the extent of what I grabbed from Doctrine Man today.

Sunday, February 22, 2015

Link Purge from the Last Week (Or So)

I've recently updated the system I use to collect news links. Here's a purge - with some commentary as necessary - of the news links I've collected in the past week.

China:
  • WOTR: Ten Reasons Why China Will Have Trouble Fighting a Modern War - I recognize the need for America and its allies to prepare for Chinese ambitions, but I remain very skeptical that China is on the verge of becoming a legitimate superpower, militarily or otherwise. These are some good reasons to question such alarmism.
  • RAND: China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) - This study was produced semi-independently from the article above, and provides more depth on the issues identified by the author of the WOTR article, in addition to other relevant topics.

    COIN:
  • War is Boring: All the Reasons Islamic State Won’t Have It Easy in Afghanistan: For one, there’s Taliban to deal with
  • CNN: Nonsense about terrorism's 'root causes' - There's been a lot of press this week about ISIS/DAESH's motives, and how to undermine its regional ambitions. This is one of those items, though
  • CNN: Why does ISIS keep making enemies? - This op-ed, also by Peter Bergen, is another such item.
  • The Atlantic: What ISIS Really Wants - The most prominent article on the topic is this one from The Atlantic.
  • Slate: The Atlantic’s big Islam lie: What Muslims really believe about ISIS - Haroon Moghul at Slate disagrees with that article in The Atlantic. I'm shocked, I swear.

    Iran:
  • War is Boring: Looks Like Iran Upgraded Syria’s Helicopters: But the regime’s not actually using the new systems
  • War is Boring: A Bunch of Iranian Drones Have Crashed in Iraq

    Science/Junk Science:
  • BBC: In pictures: Snow blankets the Middle East
  • Kuwait Times: In Pakistan, vaccinating kids becoming a deadly battle

    Kuwait - General:
  • Kuwait Times: The pros and cons of cousin marriage - Occasionally, I'll post a "Kuwaiti Headline of the Day" on Facebook. This one absolutely made the cut. Previous favorites include "Fight over 100 fils (about $0.34) renders Bangladeshi impotent", "‘Accusing Kuwaitis of laziness unfair’", "Excessive meddling ruining Kuwait Airways: MP Saleh", "New twist in Kabad camel market brawl", "Royal among three Kuwaitis in fight over bike ownership", "Daesh (ISIS) Goes Potty", "Ministry of Interior officer steals sheep", "The great Kuwaiti cat-meat scandal", and my all-time favorite, "Egyptian Sex Maniac brought to book".

    Military Kit:
  • WOTR: Getting Our Money’s Worth: LCS vs Iver Huitfeldt-Class - This one feeds into a conversation I've been having with one of my postgraduate coursemates, CN Slapshot.
  • AFP: Four US littoral combat ships to operate out of Singapore by 2018 - This feeds into the same conversation with CN Slapshot.

    Risk Management:
  • UPI: Industry: Risk aversion costs more than 'fast failure'

    Russia:
  • Sputnik: Russia May Finalize its Flagship Aircraft Carrier by 2025 - A couple of years ago, I researched the state of Russia's conventional forces, to include its navy. I wasn't impressed.
  • SPX: Russian Shipyard Makes History: 4 Subs Under Construction Simultaneously - See directly above.

    Scottish Miscellany:
  • BBC: Shetland firearms teenager to appeal against three-year sentence
  • BBC: Shetland ferry strike called off after Cosla talks
  • BBC: Wood Group warns of further cuts over low oil price
  • BBC: British Gas owner Centrica sees profits fall steeply

    Strategy:
  • BBC: How strong is the Nato military alliance?

    Terrorism:
  • Al Jazeera: Al-Shabab stages deadly attack on Somalia luxury hotel

    WMD:
  • AFP: Nuclear deterrent important in 'dangerous world', says Hollande - I mainly saved this article to share with my Strategic Nuclear Doctrine instructor, Critical Mass.

    General Chicanery:
  • Wondermark #1101
  • Wondermark #1102
  • Al Jazeera: Spring has sprung in Oregon - It can't be very frequent that Oregon gets mentioned by Al Jazeera.
  • BBC: Algeria's protracted end of an era
  • Failblog: This Wrong Number Text Ends in Excellent Home Decoration Advice
  • BBC: Rand Paul and his Ron Paul conundrum
  • Thursday, February 19, 2015

    ISIS/DAESH and the Dabiq Prophecy

    My buddy Ryan asked me for my take on an opinion piece at CNN by Peter Bergen entitled Why does ISIS keep making enemies?. I read the article. Here are some comments on specific items.
    "Adding to your list of enemies is never a sound strategy"
    Bergen obviously isn't an actual strategist, because sometimes that's absolutely a sound strategy. For example: in World War II, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, and the United States declared war on Japan *AND* Germany. In the case of ISIS/DAESH, they gain legitimacy amongst the same sort of al Qaeda, Taliban, Boko Haram type folks who think that that laundry list of other sects and religions are kufr and the Saudi types aren't Wahabist enough.
    "The mistake some make when viewing ISIS is to see it as a rational actor. Instead, as the magazine documents, its ideology is that of an apocalyptic cult that believes that we are living in the end times and that ISIS' actions are hastening the moment when this will happen."
    ISIS/DAESH *IS* a rational actor. That's the entire argument Bergen is making. He's literally talking past himself. The whole point of a rational actor is that they have a predictable philosophy, and that their actions follow corresponding patterns, and that's exactly the argument that Bergen is making. This is just as intellectually lazy as claiming that the Iranians are a bunch of millennarian lunatics who can't be reasoned with. It's ridiculous to assume that because your adversary's values and logic is different than your own, that they don't have values or logic at all.
    "In other words, ISIS wants a Western ground force to invade Syria, as that will confirm the prophecy about Dabiq."
    This is the first time I've EVER heard of this Dabiq thing. I didn't even think that Mohammed ever left the Arabian peninsula, but I could be wrong about that. This whole thing is possible, I guess, but I feel like ISIS/DAESH might have done a better job of getting that message out if Peter Bergen's the only one who's figured it out.
    "We live in an increasingly secularized world, so it's sometimes difficult to take seriously the deeply held religious beliefs of others. For many of us the idea that the end of times will come with a battle between 'Rome' and Islam at the obscure Syrian town of Dabiq is as absurd as the belief that the Mayans had that their human sacrifices could influence future events."
    This was a very silly thing for Peter Bergen to make, and a very silly comparison for him to make.
    "But for ISIS, the Dabiq prophecy is deadly serious. Members of ISIS believe that they are the vanguard fighting a religious war, which Allah has determined will be won by the forces of true Islam."
    *shrug* Could be, but if Dabiq was actually the Islamic Megiddo, I sort of feel like I'd have heard about it by now.
    "'Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn't actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combated, has already led the United States to underestimate it.' Amen to that."
    This is something that I've been thinking about a lot over the last few years. To a great degree, I feel like Western nations have failed to really understand Islamic culture and use that culture to defeat terrorism. I'm currently working to dramatically shorten a long article about the DoD's General Order 1(X), which restricts American troops' conduct in the CENTCOM AOR, and which is a case study in how not to study Islamic law. Western states have been very focused on introducing the concept of pluralism (a distinction, rather than a "separation", between religion and state), and that's a great thing and a lot of Muslims respond to it. However, it's a novel concept for many Muslims, as the Islamic tradition inexorably unites mosque and state. Westerners love to complain about sharia, and that's all well and good, but it would be nice if Western powers would actually put together some groups of people to study and understand the Quran, the Sunnan, the Ahadith, and the various commentaries on Islamic jurisprudence, and use that corpus of law to build better narratives to counter the allegedly apostate interpretation of sharia that those terrorist groups subscribe to. I don't think that's actually Bergen's point, but it ought to be.

    Wednesday, February 18, 2015

    Strategy and Risk Management

    I mentioned in a recent post that I had been corresponding with a former co-worker. He's a retired Navy officer - let's call him Sheikh - and we tend to write an E-mail or two back and forth most days. We share a lot of interests in international affairs, and though he's a Naval War College graduate, he's very gracious to ask me my take on various issues relating to strategy and international relations. Today he asked me a very interesting question: how should risk management factor into strategy? Long-time readers of this blog will know that his question is a confluence of two disciplines I've spent a great deal of time studying, so I wrote a lengthy response, and I thought I'd share an expanded version of it here.

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    My impression is that the potential relationship between risk management and strategy is lost on most strategists, and on nearly all political leaders (most of whom are conversant in neither risk management nor strategy). Sheikh is right, one would think that risk management and cost/benefit analysis would play a significant role in strategy. Clausewitz discusses it a bit in Book I, Chapter 2 of On War:
    Still more general in its influence on the resolution to peace is the consideration of the expenditure of force already made, and further required. As war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated over by the political object, therefore the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased. This will be the case, not only as regards extent, but also as regards duration. As soon, therefore, as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given up, and peace will be the result.
    Clausewitz's treatment of the issue refers specifically to treating for peace in a conflict which is already underway, but the concept stands. Meanwhile, as I noted recently, Thucydides - writing more than two thousand years before Carl von Clausewitz - characterizes strategy in terms of "fear, honor, and interest". These factors are difficult to quantify. And, given that people are willing to sacrifice a lot for political power, and given that strategy is all about achieving political objectives, it shouldn’t be surprising that some leaders are willing to make strategic sacrifices that are disproportionate to the gains.

    In a perfect world, you’d have both strategists and actuaries working together to compose and revise strategic plans based upon the costs of historically similar campaigns, the quantified benefits, and the likelihood of particular contingencies – e.g., the post-Cold War American posture of preparing for two simultaneous campaigns, notionally expected to take place in the Gulf and on the Korean Peninsula. Those plans would then drive the reconciliation of ways, means, and desired ends.

    Instead, many states tend to come up with one or more "national strategies". In America, that's the White House's National Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy, and Congress' Quadrennial Defense Review; as far as I can tell, the United Kingdom, does this through one such document, the National Security Strategy. Russia's new strategic release is getting a lot of attention lately, as is the 2015 National Security Strategy from the White House. World renowned strategist Lawrence Freedman, who wrote one of the most difficult books on strategy that I've ever read, recently gave a lecture in which he was pretty dismissive of such documents, and I think he had a point: at least in the case of the American documents, they tend to have a lot of words without providing much substance. (A couple of years ago, I posted a bunch of links about these documents, and you can go check them out.)

    I’m also reminded of an anecdote. My postgraduate advisor, who had worked as an analyst at the British Ministry of Defense before he began teaching, recounted a story from 1982 in which he had opposed the Falklands War (despite being a Thatcherite Conservative) on the grounds that the cost was disproportionate to the potential gain from retaking the islands from Argentina. He said that, at the time, he’d been of the mind that Her Majesty’s Government should have compensated each of the islanders to the tune of one million pound (I may be inflating that, but the concept stands) and relocated them back to Britain, which would have been less costly than the campaign itself. He said that in time, and particularly with Britain’s spectacular success, he came to understand Maggie Thatcher’s wisdom in pressing the issue.

    As I wrote that anecdote, I got to thinking that risk management and strategy are probably sort of like intelligence and strategy, or perhaps another corollary would be science and policy. People made a big deal out of how the Iraq War was supposedly a mistake because the intelligence was allegedly faulty. (The more accurate version of that story is seldom reported, but that's another discussion entirely.) In reality, the intelligence informed the decision to invade Iraq, but it wasn’t as simple as “the intelligence is this, therefore we will do that”. In fact, I think that risk management was a poorly advertised counter to the intelligence narrative: no, there wasn’t a high degree of confidence in the intelligence, but after 9/11, the level of risk the West was willing to accept from rogue states, and the level of risk of another 9/11-like attack, changed the strategic risk calculus. I want to present a non-military example would be climate change. Climate change is a controversial topic, and I don't want to get into that controversy. For the sake of arguments, let's assume that the world is going to warm by several degrees in the next century, and that man-made pollution has played a significant role in that outcome. For many, the argument is simple: because climate science says that X is going to happen, we must obviously do Y to prevent it. I’ve been impressed by economist Bjørn Lomborg, who is more confident in the climate predictions than I am, but who seems to take a very pragmatic attitude. He suggests that climate change isn’t the world’s most pressing risk, that the world can get more bang for its buck by trying to solve other problems (Malaria, for instance); and by preparing for a potential shift of a few degrees, rather than trying to retroactively fix the climate. He notes, sensibly in my opinion, that efforts to prevent climate change will be extremely costly with little or no chance of actually making any difference. It's a similar concept: even if you have the data entirely right, other factors are going to influence the policies which are developed to respond to the challenges in question.

    So, I think that with strategy, as with other aspects of policy, it’s important but difficult to balance the pure quantitative picture with some of the more subjective factors – like fear, honor, and interest.

    Recent RAF Article

    Late last week, I finally got a chance to read a paper from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute that I've been meaning to read for a few weeks: Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy for the U.S. Army. It's a good read, and I recommend it to anyone who's interested in the U.S. Army's new Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, counterinsurgency, and the near future of war and warfare.

    Wednesday, February 11, 2015

    Civilization versus Barbarism

    I'm certainly not a "war fan" (although I was called that, once, a long time ago), but I like to think that I recognize when the means of armed force should, and shouldn't, be employed to achieve necessary ends. Since 9/11, many have questioned the legitimacy and necessity of international campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

    On December 11th, the BBC reported that five thousand people died in jihadist violence in November of 2014. On the BBC Global News Podcast, the director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King's College London - an institution not known for its bellicosity - nonetheless used the phrases "global movement" and "generational challenge", and noted:
    "We were all a bit naive in 2011 when bin Laden was killed, the Arab Spring was coming in, apparently or seemingly ushering in a new era of democracy and freedom, that this problem would simply go away."
    - Professor Peter Neumann
    One might be forgiven for believing that Professor Neumann was channeling his inner George W. Bush. I take some exception to Professor Neumann's statement about bin Laden's death; the idea that bin Laden's death was some sort of game changer is so blatantly absurd that I was dismissing it as far back as 2006, when people were criticizing President Bush by equating bin Laden's hypothetical death with an automatic end to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Aside from that, Dr. Neumann is correct: jihadist/takfiri barbarism is a global movement, and the war between global civilization (to include Islamic civilizations - for example, recent outrage in the Islamic world over the barbaric murders perpetrated by ISIS/DAESH, as well as the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris) and that barbarism is a generational challenge. And lest our short Western memories lead us to forget what the dividends of defeat in this generational challenge yield, the BBC has also been releasing a series of compelling reports based upon dispatches from ISIS/DAESH-held territory: Mosul Diaries.

    Tuesday, February 10, 2015

    Selections from Clausewitz, Part 3

    It's time for another installment of commentary on passages from On War by Carl von Clausewitz.
    "The war of a community - of whole nations and particularly of civilised nations - always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political act."
    - Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, section 23
    This is one of the handful of "money quotes" from On War. I mentioned above that I'm not confident that the U.S. Army is educating its senior officers in strategy; instead, it's teaching them campaigning. Strategy involves the coordination of all of the instruments of national power. The current buzz word for that is "DIME": Diplomacy, Intelligence (or Information), Military, and Economics. Strategy involves orchestrating all four of those elements to achieve political goals, while campaigning typically stops at the achievement of military goals.

    There have been a handful of senior officers in recent years who have understood the difference - Generals James Mattis, David Petraeus, and H.R. McMaster being three of the most prominent - but true strategists tend to run afoul of the Army establishment. (The Marine Corps establishment does better, but because the Marine Corps is considered a junior service, and because it is to some degree subordinate to the Navy, its ability to influence the management of America's wars is limitated.) My hypothesis is that because so few Army officers actually learn strategy (and the Air Force is similarly trained in campaigning, rather than strategy), they are less able to advise America's civilian policy-makers. As a result, the campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have become complex and incoherent because their campaigns are not effectively related to the achievement of specific political goals.

    Two other terms that are outside the scope of this discussion, but may be worth discussing at a later date, are "strategic corporal" and "commander's intent".
    "We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the art of war in general and the commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception."
    - Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, section 24
    As I noted above: the means (the use of military force) must always include the object (a nation's political goals) in our conception (campaign plans and their execution).
    "But if even both these things are done, still the war, that is, the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, cannot be considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not subdued also; that is, its Government and its allies forced into signing a peace, or the people into submission; for whilst we are in full occupation of the country the war may break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance given by allies. No doubt this may also take place after a peace, but that shows nothing more than that every war does not carry in itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement."
    - Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter II
    I had a couple of thoughts about this passage. First, it identifies that while limited campaigns may be attractive in some cases, some campaigns will require the complete and total domination of the enemy. Some disputes will persist, and in so doing cost more blood and treasure than is necessary for the settlement of the political dispute. Second, the concluding sentence is an important reminder that while we prefer to perceive wars as episodes with a beginning and an end, they are in fact components in a long string of history that doesn't end.
    "There are two considerations, which as motives, may practically take the place of inability to continue the contest. The first is the improbability, the second is the excessive price of success."
    - Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter II
    This passage reminds me of deterrence and compellance. With some exceptions, the hope of most rational policy-makers is to achieve its goals, both foreign and domestic, without firing a shot. Belligerents enter into states of war because they believe that there is a probability that, in so doing, they will enjoy a reasonable chance of success. The discussion of Tirpitz below is an illustration of this concept: Tirpitz attempted to achieve naval goals commensurate with the strategic goals of Hindenburg and Ludendorff by presenting the British Royal Navy with a victory at sea whose cost exceeded its value. This concept also drove the development of nuclear strategy after 1945, nuclear strategy having developed from the theories of massive bombardment espoused by Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell after the First World War. In deterrence theory, these concepts are summarized in the two concepts noted above: deterrence by denial, and deterrence by punishment.
    "Now if we want to overcome the enemy by the duration of the contest we must content ourselves with as small objects as possible, for it is in the nature of the thing that a great end requires a greater expenditure of force than a small one; but the smallest object that we can propose to ourselves is simple passive resistance, that is a combat without any positive view. In this way, therefore, our means attain their greatest relative value, and therefore the result is best secured."
    - Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter II
    This passage reminded me a great deal of insurgencies and guerrilla warfare, in which the guerrilla/insurgent force grinds down the superior conventional force through a "death by a thousand cuts" methodology. One could also make the observation, particularly of the "small objects" terminology, that any strategy requires one or more campaign plans, which are themselves achieved through numerous tactical actions.
    "If the object of a combat is not always the destruction of the enemy's forces therein engaged — and if its object can often be attained as well without the combat taking place at all, by merely making a resolve to fight, and by the circumstances to which that gives rise — then that explains how a whole campaign may be carried on with great activity without the actual combat playing any notable part in it."
    - Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter II
    The Father of Strategy is identifying what we strategists would currently define as deterrence and compellence: the use of various aspects of national power to manipulate an adversary's behavior without actually engaging them in combat. The most famous example is probably the Cold War, but there are others - for example, I remember discussing the campaign plan of Imperial German Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz with my buddy "Warden" after we'd listened to the following portion of Sir Laurence Martin's 1981 BBC Reith Lecture: "It is not even necessary to threaten defeat. Dr Jonathan Steinberg has illustrated how, at the turn of the century, Admiral Tirpitz’s inferior German navy, by threatening the Royal Navy with more damage than it could afford to accept even for victory, was, as the title of Dr. Steinberg’s book has it, ‘yesterday’s deterrent’. In much the same way, the armed neutralities of Sweden and Switzerland are long-established examples of security sought by confronting a would-be aggressor not with defeat, but with the prospect of higher costs than the prize is worth. As we know, such strategies of deterrence have been tried before and have not always worked — it didn’t work for Tirpitz — so why do people pin so much faith on nuclear deterrence? The answer lies in the supposed potential scale of the costs and the certainty of incurring them." This is typically characterized as "deterrence by punishment", ensuring that the adversary will sustain disproportionate losses should they attempt to attack; or "deterrence by denial", ensuring that the adversary's attack will be unsuccessful and thus, not worth it. The Father of Strategy shifts his focus a bit in his first book's third chapter, so we'll pick up with that in the next installment.

    Friday, February 6, 2015

    Warfare's Fifth Dimension? Not Quite

    "First, the impression of war in the fifth domain has its origin as a US Air Force lobbying gimmick. The Air Force had already been in charge of air and space, so cyberspace came naturally. In December 2005 the US Air Force expanded its mission accordingly. That alone is not a strong argument against the term's utility, but it should be clear where the expression comes from, and what the original intention was: claiming a larger piece of a defense budget that would start to shrink at some point in the future."
    - Thomas Rid, "Cyber War Will Not Take Place"

    Sunday, February 1, 2015

    Foreign Fighters Heading to Syria

    The Washington Post has a great, albeit unsettling, map/infographic detailing the movement of foreign fighters into territory held by ISIS/DAESH. It's worth a look.