More Snowed-In Advice

The other day, I wrote about survival in place during inclement conditions. A friend of mine (who's admittedly far more of a "prepper" than me) posted some of his observations on Facebook, and I wanted to share them to a wider audience.

Things learned from the weather.

We lost power for about 24 hours beginning early Sunday morning. We have wood heat so heat was not an issue.

I have an Aladdin oil lamp my Dad got from my Grandpa and have reconditioned it and it works great. I also picked up one at a garage sale and got it going. They both work well. One thing I did notice was that the dark walls in our living room do not reflect light and it takes more sources to light the room.

We have a small generator that I used to keep the frig and freezer cold. Just ran it an hour on each one and everything stayed cold.

The LED lanterns work great and I will be adding one of those to the stash.

The generator burns gas pretty quick, about a quart per hour so if you had to run it all day that would be 6 gallons of gas.

Things like white gas and lamp oil go very quickly. In an extended outage, these items would probably be gone in the first week.

We used a propane camp stove to cook with. Just set it on top of our stove in the kitchen and it worked great.

Fortunately, we have city water and gas hot water heater. In the country you would need a generator to power your well pump, although that could be an intermittent thing.

Boredom sets in quick. We ended up playing Scrabble. We have tons of board games so we would have lots to fall back on. Plus, chores would start kicking in once the conveniences of modern day life were gone.

My experience was similar, although the closest I got to losing power was three blinks on Saturday evening. I didn't have a huge stockpile of food, but there was also no realistic expectation that I'd go more than two or three days without being able to leave the house. Even so, I probably would have needed to get pretty creative to keep myself comfortably fed for much longer; and even with cable and Internet access, cabin fever was still setting in. These are good lessons to learn in temporarily inconvenient situations, so that you can prepare for potentially prolonged disturbances.

Snow Day Documentaries

I'm snowed in, so instead of making the most of my time by studying, I decided to compile links to a bunch of documentaries about Afghanistan that are available on YouTube. I figured I'd share.

By the way, as you can see from the picture, my advice from about a year ago was pretty accurate in 2013 and thus far in 2014. I have yet to witness a zombie apocalypse, a collapse of Western society, or a massive uprising against the American government. What I have seen plenty of, both back in the States and prior to leaving Scotland, has been inclement weather and naturally occurring phenomena. These incidents haven't required those affected to escape and live off the land; rather, it's required them to prepare, resource, and execute plans to wait at home until conditions improve. (As for yours truly, I could stand to have a couple more packs of ground lamb, but the power and the Internet have been solid, so I'm a pretty happy camper.)

Anyway, here are the documentaries.

* * *
First and foremost, these are well worth the time to watch.

British Marines fight The Taliban 1 of 4

British Marines fight The Taliban 2 of 4

British Marines fight The Taliban 3 of 4

British Marines fight The Taliban 4 of 4

Our War: Ambushed

Our War: The Invisible Enemy

Our War: Caught in the Crossfire

Our War: The Lost Platoon

Our War: Into the Hornet's Nest

Our War: Series II - Return to Death Valley

The Battle for Bomb Alley (1/2)

The Battle for Bomb Alley (2/2)

Filmmaker Chris Terrill has made two great documentary series' about the Royal Marines and Afghanistan, and these are listed below.

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 1 - The Shock of Capture

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 2 - Carrot and Stick

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 3 - The Lost Patrol

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 4 - Tears and Fears

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 5 - Enemy Contact

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 6 - Operation Sparrowhawk

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 7 - Dawn Assault

Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 8 - Royal Marines To Your Duties

Commando: On the Front Line: The 55 Year Old Commando

Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Deadly Underfoot

Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Venus Fly Trap

Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Dogs of War

Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Kill or Capture

Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Brothers in Arms

Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - The Final Reckoning

This next documentary is best watched in concert with this report.

The Battle for Marjah

This next selection is excellent, though I see that YouTube has removed a number of the episodes. The link to the actual BBC Episode Guide is included as the fourth link.

Young Soldiers: The Shock of Capture

Young Soldiers: Should I Stay or Should I Go

Young Soldiers: Countdown to Afghan

BBC Episode Guide

I haven't watched any of these documentaries yet, but I may over the course of the next week.

Fighting the Taliban

Australia's Secret War - Tour of Duty

Dateline Behind Enemy Lines (1/2)

Dateline Behind Enemy Lines (2/2)

Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4

Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4

Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4

Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4

The TA and The Taliban: 2 Scots (1/3)

The TA and The Taliban: 2 Scots (2/3)

The TA and The Taliban: 2 Scots (3/3)

The TA and The Taliban: 2 Para (1/3)

The TA and The Taliban: 2 Para (2/3)

The TA and The Taliban: 2 Para (3/3)

Meeting the Taleban (1/4)

Meeting the Taleban (2/4)

Meeting the Taleban (3/4)

Meeting the Taleban (4/4)

Endgame Afghanistan 1/2

Endgame Afghanistan 2/2

That's it for now. Check back soon.

A Few Recent Selections

I have a long list of articles I want to discuss at length. I've been busy with a few other projects lately, so in lieu of some of those articles, here are some of the items I've been attempting to keep abreast of lately.

China

Perception outweighs ability as China builds blue-water fleet - News - Stripes

China Thinks It Can Defeat America in Battle

Equipment

PONI Live Debate: Triad Modernization | Center for Strategic and International Studies

Saving the Kiowa

SecDef Should Crack Whip On Cyber, Drones, & Training Foreigners | Small Wars Journal

Connecting Air Support Acquisitions and National Strategy | Small Wars Journal

US Plans Radical Upgrade of Stryker Brigades

Trouble Brewing Between US Army's Active Duty and Guard Forces

Is Precision the Future of CAS?

Army Modernization Is Melting Down

$1B in Air Force cargo planes sent to boneyard get new missions - U.S. - Stripes

Bring on the Countermeasure Drones

The Navy’s Getting a Big, Secretive Special Operations ‘Mothership’

Security

CSIS: Considering the Caucasus Emirate Chemical Attack Threat to Sochi

Strategy

Speaking of the Long War

French Counterterrorism in the Sahel

Is War Too Important to be Left to Social Scientists?

Counterinsurgencies and Deterrence

Lessons From Previous Competitive Strategies

Peace, Art and … Special Operations

Does America Have Any Naval Strategists Anymore?

Failure to Learn: Reflections on a Career in the Post-Vietnam Army

Five Questions with Steven Metz on U.S. Landpower

Learning Large Lessons from Small Wars

Lessons Observed on Lessons Observed: IEDs, Advising, and Armor

The misuse of American might, and the price it pays

Army Presses Case for Relevance of Ground Forces (UPDATED)

Gulf Region

Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the "Clash within a Civilization"

191 Nepalis died in Qatar last year - Kuwait Times | Kuwait Times

Qatar: Syria rebels' tiny ally in the background

The Geneva Joint Plan Of Action: How Iran Sees It (1)

America Must Assuage Saudi Anxiety - NYTimes.com

Oman orders NASAMS air defense system

Afghanistan

Pakistani Unconventional Warfare Against Afghanistan

Taking Tea with the Taliban

Why U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan

Other

WW1 soldier diaries placed online by National Archives

Deer 'pose biggest threat' to Scotland's native woodlands

Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza | RAND

This Is How the World Could Have Ended

Carrier Aircraft and Economies of Scale

About a year ago, I posted a brief discussion of security strength through diversification, using the U.S. Air Force's fixation on fifth generation aircraft as an illustration. A great counter-example is the U.S. Navy and what Wired.com refers to as the Navy's Stealth Plan B.

For those who are unaware, the Navy hasn't so much diversified its fleet of aircraft. Instead, the Navy has achieved some economies of scale through a pretty intelligent approach. When the venerable F-14 Tomcat was retired in 2006, it was replaced by the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Meanwhile, the Navy is replacing its EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare fleet (itself a derivative of the A-6 Intruder) with the E/A-18G Growler. The Super Hornet and the Growler are derived from the F/A-18(A/B/C/D) Hornet. This has allowed the Navy to manage some of the risks of maintaining multiple supply and production lines, resulting in economies of scale. The Navy has accepted some parallel risk by placing most of its aviation eggs in one basket, so to speak.

Obviously, these concepts are applied on a very large scale, but the concept can be applied on smaller scales as well.

Considering Iranian-American Relations

As the politicians and pundits discuss the recent nuclear deal with Iran, I thought I'd put together a few resources for anyone who's interested in a crash course on post-Revolutionary Iranian-American relations. People tend to have heard of Operation Ajax, in which American and British operatives facilitated a coup d'état against Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadegh after he began nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. People have a vague idea of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and they know who Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Shah Reza Pahlavi were. (Oddly enough, as Daniel J. Flynn notes in his book A Conservative History of the American Left, Khomeini's accession was initially lauded by Western elites as a harbinger of Iranian liberalization and democratic reform that ultimately failed to materialize.) Some are also familiar with the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing. However, there are a lot of good resources out there about the very difficult relationship between Iran and the West, and particularly America, since 1979.

The best places to start are a 2009 BBC documentary series entitled "Iran and the West" (parts 1, 2, and 3), and a 2013 New Yorker article entitled The Shadow Commander. In the latter article, author Dexter Filkins focuses his narrative on Major General Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps' Quds Force - the Iranian corollary to the CIA's Special Activities Division. If you ignore everything else, you ought to invest some time in those four items. Beyond these resources, what follows are some topical sections on various aspects of Western-Iranian relations since 1979.

* * *
The Iran-Iraq War

Mark Bowden's Guests of the Ayatollah provides some of the best discussion of the Iran Hostage Crisis and the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War that I've ever read. Before I go into detail, here's a brief, oversimplified synopsis of the Iran-Iraq War and its aftermath.

For a variety of reasons, Iraq invaded Iran in September of 1980. The war involved various offensives, but was essentially an eight year stalemate that revisited many of the tactics and conditions of the First World War in a Middle Eastern venue. Alliances shifted, with various outside actors supplying both belligerents at various times (notably in, but not limited to, the Iran-Contra affair). For the most part, the West supported Iraq because although Iraq was a Soviet client state, Iran was considered the greater strategic threat - particularly after the aforementioned Iran Hostage Crisis. Eventually, the stalemate and Iranian tactics exhausted the Iraqi economy, and although the Gulf monarchies disliked the Hussein regime, they also considered Iran to be the greater threat. The Gulf states began propping up the Iraqi economy by transporting Iraqi oil out of the Gulf, at which point the Iranians began to attack GCC tankers with mines, at which point the United States got involved by re-flagging tankers as American ships and escorting them with U.S. Navy vessels. Iran continued mining American ships, which resulted in American retaliation (discussed below). With both nations exhausted, the war ended in an effective draw in August of 1988. At this point, the Hussein regime demanded economic assistance from the GCC, who declined; Hussein also accused Kuwait of slant-drilling. In 1990, Iraq responded to the GCC by invading and annexing Kuwait (which had traditionally been part of the Ottoman wilayat of Basra) and attacking Saudi Arabia. After months of failed diplomacy, Iraqi forces were forcibly expelled from Kuwait in early 1991 by an American-led, United Nations-mandated coalition. Beyond the prior confrontations with American forces, Iranian leaders witnessed the American-led coalition doing to Iraq in a matter of days what they themselves had failed to do in a matter of years. This is widely believed to be a prevailing motivator for Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Though little-known to Americans, post-Revolution American-Iranian relations deteriorated further as a result of the The Tanker War, notable elements of which were Operation Earnest Will, Operation Prime Chance, Operation Eager Glacier, Operation Nimble Archer, and Operation Praying Mantis. The last of these was a direct response to the Iranian mine strike on USS Samuel B. Roberts. Relations were further complicated by the accidental American shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 by USS Vincennes.

Support to Insurgent and Terrorist Groups

Beyond its prominent role operating Hezbollah in Lebanon and elsewhere, and supporting other groups such as Hamas, Iran's role in and relating to Afghanistan and Iraq have been complex. As noted by Dexter Filkins in the article linked above, Iran nearly went to war with Afghanistan prior to 9/11, and Iranian and Western forces cooperated in Afghanistan against the Taliban in 2001 and early 2002.

Iran helped overthrow Taliban, candidate says

Ismail Khan, Herat and Iranian Influence

Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Iranian Special Forces Reportedly Fight Alongside US in Battle for Herat

However, after relations deteriorated once more, the Iranians subsequently appear to have provided some support to both the Taliban and al Qaeda. This has apparently involved providing al Qaeda with logistical assistance and safe havens, and possibly supplying weapons to the Taliban.

BBC Documentary: The Afghan Arms Bazaar

State Department: Iran Supports Al Qaeda, Taliban

Gates: Iran’s support for Taliban ‘limited’

Hague fury as 'Iranian arms' bound for Taliban seized

Iran Hedges its Bets in Afghanistan

State Department: Iran supports Taliban, Iraqi militants

Al Qaeda in Iran

Strange bedfellows - Iran and al Qaeda

Analysis: Spinning Iran and al Qaeda, part 1

Analysis: Spinning Iran and al Qaeda, part 2

The Iran/al Qaeda relationship has been tenuous, and has backfired upon both Iran and al Qaeda at times. The article about Qassem Suleimani notes that initial cooperation with al Qaeda in Iraq eventually collapsed, fueling the Sunni/Shiite sectarian war that took place over the course of several years. Iran supplied specialized weapons to Shiite insurgents...

U.S. Sees New Weapon In Iraq: Iranian EFPs

Iranian sniper rifles in the hands of Iraqi insurgents

Report: High-Tech Austrian Rifles Sold to Iran Turning Up in Hands of Iraqi Insurgents

Iraqi insurgents using Austrian rifles from Iran

... and simultaneously kept several members of Osama bin laden's family in Iran.

Osama bin Laden's family missing since 9/11 attacks found living in secret compound in Iran

Osama bin Ladens family stranded in Iran, son says

There are a couple of other articles about Iran and afghanistan that are worth reading:

Freewheeling Herat Fearful of US Pullout

Iran reopens Afghan consulate after protests

Iran and the Gulf

I could probably write a book on recent relations between Iran and its relations with the various neighbors. Having already skirted around the situation vis a vis Iraq, here are a few articles discussing recent interaction, mostly adversarial, between Iran and Bahrain, the only Shiite-majority GCC member...

Bahrain's King: Foreign plot to destabilize country foiled

Bahrain tensions a trigger for Gulf turmoil

Iran told to keep out of Saudi-Bahrain affairs

Bahrain Jails Three Iran 'spies'

... Qatar and the United Arab Emirates...

Iran brushes off UAE call for talks on Gulf islands

Qatar, UAE request $7.6 billion in missile defense: U.S.

Qatar and UAE look to bolster defence systems

Qatar, UAE request $7.6 bn in missile defense: US

... Kuwait...

Kuwait condemns three to death in Iran spy ring

Kuwait: Iran involved in spy ring

Iran rejects Kuwait spy cell allegation

Kuwait Said To Bust Spy Ring

Govt should monitor Syrian intel activities

Lot Of Spy Networks Using Kuwait As A Transit Point

'Security, stability of Kuwait at risk' - 'Foreign hands at work'

... Oman (whose relations with Iran remain the closest of the Gulf nations due to a variety of factors specific to Oman)...

US official lauds Oman’s peace efforts in region

Oman Navigates Between Iran and Arab Nations

Oman-Iran Foreign Relations

As Tension Between Iran and the West Escalates, Keep Oman in Mind

Former Iranian diplomat freed by UK arrives in Oman

Oman secures release of Iranian diplomat

GCC states slam Iran interference in region

GCC lashes out at Iran, urges Syria transition

Iran-Oman Joint Military Committee Wraps Up Work in Tehran

Iran, Oman discuss military ties

Iran, Oman commanders meet on military cooperation

Iran-Oman military begins joint five-day meet in Muscat

Iran, Oman to hold new joint naval drills

Iran, Oman Ink Agreement on Defensive Cooperation

Cooperation key to regional security: Iran

Iran, Oman Underline Boosting Military Cooperation

Iran, Oman to Hold Joint Drills in Winter

... and Saudi Arabia.

Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria

Qatar crosses the Syrian Rubicon: £63m to buy weapons for the rebels

Taliban Opening Qatar Office, and Maybe Door to Talks

Syria crisis: Qatar handing embassy over to opposition

Qatar to give Syria opposition embassy

The New Cold War

Man shot dead as police clash with Shiites in Saudi Arabia

Shia Days of Rage

To Stop Iran, Get a New Saudi King

The West is frequently criticized for its close relations with the GCC's authoritarian regimes. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations between the West and the GCC states solidified due to the mutually adversarial relationships between Iran and both parties. (This was later strengthened by distrust of Iraq, but that's another topic for another day.) People tend to focus on Iran's nuclear program with respect to its actual potential destructive capacity and range. While these concerns are legitimate, Iran's tendency to eschew direct confrontation in favor of more covert, irregular methods demonstrates that the underlying concern should be how a potential Iranian nuclear capability might be used to advance Iranian political objectives in the region. One major concern is that an Iranian nuclear capability would compel the Saudis, and potentially the Egyptians and the Turks, to pursue their own nuclear programs in order to deter Iran's influence. (I'm working on an upcoming post that will focus specifically on this issue.)

American Relationships with Dissident Groups

While in no way claiming any moral equivalence between Iranian support for terrorist groups, and American support for the following groups, it's worth noting that Iranian distrust of the West typically takes Western support for such dissident groups into account. (There's a sort of chicken/egg dichotomy that's worth noting on that one.) There have been suggestions of covert Western support to the Balochi insurgent group known as Jundallah, formerly led by the late Abdolmalek Rigi...

Car Bombing in Iran Kills 11, Wounds 31 Elite Revolutionary Guards

Iranian bombing 'kills 11 people'

Iran blast points to ethnic tensions

Bomb kills 11 on military bus in Iran

Clashes reported in Iranian city

2nd blast in 3 days hits Iranian city

Order restored after blast at girls school in Iran

ABC News Exclusive: The Secret War Against Iran

... and Western states have openly worked with the Mojehedin e Khalq (People's Mujahideen of Iran), a leftist group that worked with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and subsequently took asylum in Iraq at Camp Ashraf until relatively recently.

People's Mujahedin of Iran

U.S. protects Iranian opposition group in Iraq

Global Security: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization

Analysis: Is MeK still a terrorist group?

UK's 'terror' ban appeal denied

Iranian group in UK terror win

* * *
There's obviously a lot of information to go through, and it could easily take a person days or even weeks to try and read or process it all. These items are barely scratching the surface of these issues. The relationship is complicated, it's always been complicated, and it will remain complicated. People like things to be wrapped up neatly and tidily - we're conditioned by books, movies, and television to expect that. In truth, Western States have strategic goals that compete directly with those of post-Revolutionary Iran. It's difficult for any expert to identify significant opportunities for compromise and cooperation, or to foresee a future in which those strategic goals will overlap. As such, and despite pronouncements and celebration of deals over Iran's nuclear program - and judging from the nightly rhetoric on Iran's Voice of Justice broadcasts - the underlying conflict between Iran and the West will continue into the foreseeable future.

The Post-Google Reader Blues

Every now and again, I hit news burnout. I hit the wall earlier this year and haven't been regularly reading the news for the last few months. While I was on my news hiatus, we as a society lost Google Reader. I've attempted on several occasions to get Feedly to work, and finally got it sorted out on Friday morning. I made a little effort to use Pulse on my Kindle Fire, but it's fairly tedious to use, so I haven't taken to it like I did to Google Reader.

As I was sorting Feedly out, I went to look at a blog I used to enjoy, Abu Muqawama. The author, Andrew Exum, took a leave of absence a little over a year ago, and left the blog to a couple of long-term guest authors. While reviewing my old feeds, I discovered not only that Exum has discontinued the blog, but that it's taken less than a month for the Center for a New American Security to straight up delete it, in its entirety. I'm actually rather upset, because there are several of Exum's posts that I would have copied and saved for my own purposes. There are also rumblings that the Ink Spots blog has gone defunct, though it's at least still present.

At any rate, something else that I've come up with, using my mad HTML editing skills, is my own local HTML file (built from the OPML file I exported from Google Reader) that organizes my feeds. It's much lower tech than Google Reader, Feedly, or Pulse, but it has the virtue of being a touch more reliable than free services (or blogs) that can disappear, even without any sort of notice.

Just in case you're curious what's currently in my feed, have a look:

General News Site; RSS: BBC News - NE Scotland, Orkney & Shetland Site; RSS: CNN.com - WORLD Site; RSS: Guardian World News

Middle East News Site; RSS: al Arabiya English - Middle East Site; RSS: al Jazeera English Site; RSS: Arab Times Site; RSS: BBC News - Middle East Site; RSS: CNN.com - WORLD/Middle East Site; RSS: The Economist: Middle East and Africa Site; RSS: Kuwait Times Site; RSS: Memri Latest Reports Site; RSS: Muscat Daily Oman News Site; RSS: Oman Observer Site; RSS: Oman Tribune Site; RSS: Site Intelligence Group - Jihadist News Site; RSS: Times Of Oman

Global Security News Site; RSS: 1913 Intel Site; RSS: Abu Muqawama Site; RSS: CNN Security Clearance Site; RSS: CSIS: Event Feed Site; RSS: CSIS: Publication Feed Site; RSS: FAS Strategic Security Blog Site; RSS: Foreign Affairs Site; RSS: Foreign Policy Site; RSS: Guardian: Julian Borger's global security blog Site; RSS: Ink Spots Site; RSS: Kevin Hanrahan Site; RSS: Michael J. Totten's blog Site; RSS: Michael Totten Site; RSS: Michael Yon - Online Magazine Site; RSS: Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict Site; RSS: Small Wars Journal Site; RSS: Spacewar.com Site; RSS: The Long War Journal (Site-Wide) Site; RSS: Wired.com Danger Room Site; RSS: Wired.com Threat Level Site; RSS: Understanding War Site; RSS: War Is Boring

Podcasts Site; RSS: BBC Documentaries Site; RSS: BBC Global News Site; RSS: BBC Kermode and Mayo's Film Reviews Site; RSS: BBC Newshour Site; RSS: BBC Xtra Arabic Site; RSS: The Faroe Islands Podcast Site; RSS: Fit for Duty Site; RSS: The Heritage Foundation - Past Events Site; RSS: The History Chicks Site; RSS: KSL Nightside Project Site; RSS: The Michael Medved Show Site; RSS: NASACast Audio Site; RSS: Orkney Talking Newspaper Site; RSS: Prime Minister's Questions Site; RSS: The Sporkful Site; RSS: War Studies' Podcast

Webcomics Site; RSS: AmazingSuperPowers Site; RSS: Ctrl+Alt+Del Site; RSS: Cyanide and Happiness Site; RSS: Filibuster Cartoons Site; RSS: Pearls Before Swine Site; RSS: Penny Arcade Site; RSS: Real Life Comics Site; RSS: Romantically Apocalyptic Site; RSS: Terminal Lance Site; RSS: Wondermark Site; RSS: xkcd.com

Pictures Site; RSS: Astronomy Picture of the Day Site; RSS: Uploads from Callum McKain Site; RSS: Uploads from chimpaction Site; RSS: Uploads from Defence Images Site; RSS: Uploads from Official U.S. Navy Imagery Site; RSS: Uploads from the Oregon Military Department Site; RSS: Uploads from Orkneyjar Site; RSS: Uploads from The Central Intelligence Agency Site; RSS: Uploads from The United States Army Site; RSS: Uploads from United States Marine Corps

General Interest Site; RSS: McSweeney's Site; RSS: Musings from a Stonehead

You know what they say: knowledge is power.

More Thoughts on Middle Eastern Borders

A few days ago, I posted my thoughts about this excellent article, which discusses the issue of Middle Eastern borders. As I've been doing some research to follow on from my dissertation, I remembered a recent graphic I'd seen in another article, and looked it up to share: "How 5 Countries Could Become 14"; the article is titled "Imagining a Remapped Middle East". The second article is sort of ridiculous for a number of reasons.

There's sort of a prevailing view, generally attributed to President Woodrow Wilson, that the solution to international conflicts is often to carve terrain up into independent states handed off primarily to independent ethnic groups. This is often pejoratively called "Balkanization", inspired by the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia into a sort of adversarial neighborhood of smaller, independent states. As a United States Senator, Vice President Biden even advocated for a "soft partition" - de facto independence - for Iraq's three major population groups. That original article points out some of the big problems with that concept, one of which is stated as follows:

"At best, creating more countries would have just meant more borders to fight over, while fewer large countries would have turned regular wars into civil ones."

To be fair, the New York Times article/graphic is attempting to report on what the author thinks might happen in the foreseeable future, rather than advocating for it. Even so, author Robin Wright (who's associated with the United States Institute of Peace and the Wilson Center - what did I say earlier about President Wilson's philosophy?) doesn't appear to have quite the grasp of history or politics that Nick Danforth (author of the first article) does. While I'd be tempted to give her the benefit of the doubt by presuming that she wasn't involved in the actual composition of the graphic, she unfortunately uses the phrases "Sunnistan" and "Shiitestan", which suggests that the graphic's use of the terms "Wahhabistan" and "Alawitestan" were also inspired by the author. Beyond the obvious problems with this idea that Nick Danforth discussed in that first article, the use of the "-stan" suffix. There's a reason why the only region in the quasi-Arab world whose name ends in "-stan" is "Kurdistan": because "-stan" is Indo-Persian, not Arabic, hence the countries of "Greater Persia" (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, et. al.) carrying that suffix. The fact that Ms. Wright uses this term betrays an ignorance of the region about which she's writing.

The whole thing reminds me of a challenge I had while working in the Middle East. In mid-February 2011, a marginalized portion of Kuwait's population began holding sporadic demonstrations in several locations in and around Kuwait City, and I was responsible for briefing my organization's leaders on these protests. This required me to educate them on the fact that there was, in fact, a difference between a "bidun/بدون‎", meaning "without nationality" - these were the folks who were protesting - and a "bedouin/بَدَوِي", meaning "nomad/wanderer". I found that despite having only recently arrived in the reason, I was very nearly the only person in the entire organization - some of these folks having been there for years who knew that there was a distinction.

The fact that more than a decade after 9/11, more than two decades after the Gulf War, more than three decades after the Islamic Revolution, the majority of military leaders and commentators on international affairs remain this clueless about fairly basic aspects of Middle Eastern affairs is pretty upsetting. It's unfortunate that an article this misinformed was actually published in the New York Times, which is meant to be America's journal of record.

Perhaps even more disconcerting is that this Wilsonian concept of partition and Balkanization is still considered a viable solution to international challenges. It's one of the reasons why I'm so skeptical about the prospect of Scotland becoming an independent state, as I've discussed elsewhere. This isn't to say that unification and integration are panaceas for those same challenges, but where integration is possible, it has tended to produce better results than the alternative. Some examples of this have been the Korean Peninsula, Yemen, and South Sudan, where fragmentation has produced adverse results; and Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Germany, where unification has produced positive results. (I personally think that there's a case to be made for taking pieces of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to make an independent Balochistan and an independent Pashtunistan, but that's another discussion entirely.) Whenever possible, even when it's challenging, national and international risks tend to be better managed by working in concert than by working independently.