Saturday, February 15, 2014

Thoughts on Computer Network Defense

AFP: US launches voluntary cybersecurity plan
The US administration on Wednesday launched a cybersecurity plan which aims to use voluntary collaboration from the private sector to protect critical infrastructure from computer hackers.

The initiative stems from an executive order issued last year by President Barack Obama after repeated failures in Congress of a cybersecurity law.
I could wax eloquent (and not-so-eloquent) on this topic for quite a while, but I want to identify a few key points (while endeavouring to avoid politics). For the sake of clarity, I'm blockquoting the individual points to set them apart.

1) People don't understand the risks, and/or they're only willing to mitigate them as much as they think they have to.
The reason why many businesses, and even government agencies, have failed to get up to speed on the issue of network security is twofold: they don't understand it, and the risk of damage isn't seen as commensurate to the reward of robust security. To some degree, that's starting to change, as the potential liability costs of the recent Target data breach and similar incidents are beginning to show. In that way, network security is similar to other types of security: organizations will spend precisely what they think they must, and not a penny more, because security is an overhead item that cuts into their bottom line. That's the cost/benefit analysis and/or risk management piece.

Beyond that, the leaders of many organizations simply don't understand the threat. At the risk of over-generalizing, there's a very narrow demographic that's young enough to understand en masse how modern technology works, while simultaneously remembering conditions prior to its proliferation in the last couple of decades. Outside of that portion of the demographic spectrum, you two groups. Most of those who are older than the aforementioned group are, in essence, "immigrants" to modern technology and; at best, these folks "speak" technology with a pronounced accent. Meanwhile, those younger than the aforementioned group are so accustomed to modern technology (such as social media, which conditions them to share every aspect of their lives), that they often fail to comprehend the need for confidentiality. (I've written about a couple of aspects of this challenge before, here and here.) The result is that it's very difficult for organizations to instill a culture of security awareness, either in the boardroom or in cubeville.
2) Convenience is part of the problem.
Everyone's heard the phrase "the path of least resistance". Technology has blazed its own superhighway of least resistance. We've all seen it on the micro level: people would rather use their debit card than worry about cash, or follow their GPS in lieu of learning a route. In many cases, we as a culture have largely lost the corresponding low-tech skills that most people had only a few years ago.

On the macro level, network security experts love the example of hackers being able take down a power grid, or a water or sewage system, or a variety of other public works elements that are potentially more devastating than the threat of identity theft or credit card fraud that could stem from the aforementioned Target data breach. While I'm sympathetic to the potential benefits and efficiencies afforded by networking, these examples always cause me to wonder, "Who's the genius who thought it was a good idea to hook control of a power grid up to the Internet?" In popular media, I was always intrigued by this theme in the 2003 to 2008 Battlestar Galactica TV series, in which the eponymous warship's computers were not networked in order to prevent the sort of security issues we agonize over today.
3) We need to start applying more common sense to the problem.
The problem is getting worse. For example, Comcast is now offering XFINITY® Home, which allows subscribers to wire numerous aspects of their home into their Internet for management from their mobile devices. Am I the only one who remembers this scene from Skyfall?
Now, do I think that a product like XFINITY® Home is going to lead to an epidemic of exploding homes? No, but I'm also not confident enough in home security systems - or, rather, in your average customer. A guy I used to work with was fond of saying "there's no patch for User 1.0". Between technical vectors like phone cloning or mobile phone spyware, and social media vectors like vishing and weak passwords, do we really think that the average person's phone ought to be connected to their security system? The potential for malicious and accidental catastrophes, both from user error and attacker sophistication, brings real questions regarding the cost/benefit analysis of these innovations.
None of this is to say that I'm some sort of luddite - far from it. However, many conveniences that we take for granted open vectors for unsavory elements to attack.

The DoD has some good resources for network security, but they're highly militarized. Some more user-friendly resources are available at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Computer Security Resource Center. At the risk of getting political, the Obama Administration's approach to most problems involves intensive government efforts. The truth, though, is that we as a country, and we as individuals, rely upon so many individual and networked pieces of technology that government-spearheaded efforts simply won't put a dent in the potential risks. Individuals and organizations will have to be proactive for themselves, with the understanding that the threat to sensitive information and to critical infrastructure is growing. At the same time, we need to start thinking before we automate and wire up any and every aspect of our lives. To quote Ian Malcolm:


I realize that that's three pop culture references in one post, and I can only apologize and promise to try harder next time.

Friday, February 14, 2014

Iranian Nuclear Issues and Sensitive Information Protection

AFP: Iran demands 'proof' of nuclear weapons allegations
Iran said Wednesday it would not accept longstanding allegations that its nuclear programme once had a military dimension without seeing the secret documents on which the charges are based.
First and foremost, Iran knows this isn't going to happen. That information is almost certainly classified, and part of the reason for classifying information isn't so much to protect the information itself, but to protect methods and sources. There's no doubt that Iran wants to work at figuring out those methods and sources, so that it can mitigate those information leaks in one manner or another in order to prevent future leaks of sensitive information about its nuclear program. This statement from Iran probably relates to an item from last week that I discussed on Facebook with on of my coursemates from Aberdeen, CN Slapshot. As he's well read on some of the specifics, I shall now quote him without asking permission first:
EBWs are part of what is known as 'Project 110', which intelligence sources given to the IAEA, explain as an attempt to synchronize detonations on a spherical or hemispherical device to within 130 nano seconds. While EBWs have civilian applications, such a narrow synchronization timeframe does not. Further, the Iranians might have to explain 'Project 111'- an attempt to design a warhead for the Shabab 3 MRBM that could detonate at 600m above the ground, which is a height that is completely ineffective for the deliverance of traditional ordinance. Nuclear weapons are usually airbursted- the first weapon ever used in a war was detonated at a height of 580m. Lastly, they should explain the attempted development of neutron detonators that are designed to compress uranium deuteride to produce neutrons for detonation. Such a device has no civilian application.
Iran has both financial and strategic stakes in ensuring that the current round of seemingly promising negotiations over its nuclear program don't fail; the international community has a mainly strategic stake in the same, but it also has a strategic stake in not upsetting the balance of power in the Gulf, and in not upsetting the global balance of nuclear power. Revelations such as the one in question, and several others since the deal was heralded a couple of months ago, would call an eventual comprehensive deal into question. The Iranian government wants tight control over the information about its nuclear program, just as the international community wants to protect the methods and sources it employs to collect its own information.

For what it's worth, experts are divided on the likely outcome of a notional Iranian nuclear weapons test. About a year ago, I read a report from CNAS entitled Atomic Kingdom, in which the authors argued that the Saudi government was likely to pursue nuclear security guarantees in lieu of its own nuclear program. I read the report, and thought that their data made precisely the opposite case, so I wasn't surprised when the BBC published an article corroborating my appraisal later in 2013. In January, noted American nuclear scientist Siegfried S. Hecker and former Secretary of Defense William Perry co-authored an article entitled Iran's Path to Nuclear Peace; it's worth reading, though it assumes (contrary to much of the evidence, and probably for the sake of diplomacy) that Iran's nuclear program is actually for peaceful purposes. (The article also claims that Iran doesn't have enough indigenous uranium to sustain a nuclear energy program, though I know that the IAEA recently visited an Iranian uranium mine, so I'm not sure whether that's a disconnect or if Iran's mines just don't have much uranium.) Two other recent posturing incidents on Iran's part are its claim that it's going to sail an (apparently quite modest fleet near American territorial waters, and an apparent successful missile test from earlier this week.

I want to get back to the topic of classified and/or sensitive information, because looking at the critical information elements of this dispute (from both the Iranian and non-Iranian perspectives) can provide some valuable lessons for companies and individuals.

I can't remember the source off the top of my head, but either a fictional drama about espionage, or else a source from last year's Strategic Intelligence course, talks about methods and motivators to get people to hand over sensitive information. Motivations for an agent can range wildly; a source could be convinced that his country gives him no grounds to be patriotic, or that providing the information is actually an expression of his own patriotism. Others are persuaded by blackmail - for example, the KGB and GRU Were well known for sending prostitutes to consort with various intelligence targets in bugged hotel rooms in order to discredit them, or else to blackmail them for information. (I've heard rumors that certain Middle Eastern regimes have done the same sort of thing.) Another motivator is money, which is why vetting for security clearances often includes both credit checks to ensure that potential employees aren't under pressure from large debts; and lifestyle appraisals to ensure that those same potential employees won't get themselves into a situation in which the promise of money would entice them. As I noted in my Strategic Intelligence term paper:
One example of this is the Robert Hanssen case, in which an FBI counterintelligence officer was convicted of having accepted payment of $1.4 million in cash and diamonds over the course of twenty-two years - an average of only about $64,000 per year[1], substantially less than the annual operating cost of most SIGINT assets and considerably less than the cost of a single GEOINT asset. Similarly illustrative is the case of Ronald William Pelton, who betrayed Operation Ivy Bells - the U.S. Navy's operation to tap unencrypted Soviet communications cables in the Sea of Okhotsk - for a mere $40,000.[2] [1] Wise, David; Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America; Random House; New York City, New York; 2003 [2] Drew, Christopher and Sontag, Sherry and Annette Lawrence Drew; Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage; PublicAffairs; New York City, New York; 1998
When one considers how delicate and labor-intensive vetting, information security measures, and asset recruiting efforts are, it's easy to see why so many national security folks are upset with people like Bradley Manning, Julian Assange, and Edward Snowden.
The same concepts can be distilled down to the corporate level. One way I've heard this explained is through the invocation of the "New York Times Rule" and its "Karachi Corollary": if you don't want your boss to see something on the front page of the New York Times, or for a terrorist to be able to find it while sitting at an Internet cafe in Karachi, Pakistan, then you need to protect your information accordingly. I'm obviously not talking about corporations hiding their efforts to construct an illicit nuclear program. Instead, I'm talking about corporations, or any organization or individual, taking appropriate measures to protect their own critical information. I've talked about the Five Step OPSEC Process before, but it's never a bad time to review it:

1) Identify critical information
2) Threat analysis
3) Vulnerability analysis
4) Risk assessment
5) Implement OPSEC Measures

While I wouldn't recommend that individuals or companies develop illicit nuclear weapons, I would recommend that they learn from the ongoing dispute with Iran, and protect their sensitive information accordingly.

Thursday, February 13, 2014

Austerity and Naval Strategy

As I've noted previously, I'm a longtime student of naval strategy. I wanted to take this opportunity to share a few articles I've collected over the last few years. The question of how to continue safeguarding American interests while searching for efficiencies has been both prominent and contentious for several years now, and the Navy has spent those last few years quietly pursuing a pretty effective campaign of doing just that. As I noted in my dissertation:
Western militaries have recently considered a variety of options for managing international security challenges with a smaller footprint. Naval advocates, for example, propose a variety of approaches, from fielding modified destroyers optimized for stand-alone missions[1] ; to increased emphasis on comparatively inexpensive amphibious assault ships[2] ; vice supercarriers.[3] (The experimental 2012 conversion of USS Ponce into a Gulf-based logistics platform[4] ironically reflects the use of similar assets off the Dhofari coast to facilitate logistical support for Operation Badree.[5]) These approaches mirror the 2011 NATO campaign in Libya, in which amphibious vessels spearheaded operations utilizing embarked V/STOL aircraft and attack helicopters[6], vice a supercarrier and air wing.

[1] Albaugh, Kurt; “Six Frigates and the Future of Gunboat Diplomacy”; Small Wars Journal; Bethesda, MD; 04APR2011; http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/722-albaugh.pdf

[2] Axe, David; Navy’s Newest Assault Ship Moonlights as Pint-Sized Aircraft Carrier; Wired.com; N/A; 22OCT2012; http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/navy-mini-carrier/

[3] Ottens, Nick; Amphibs vs Carriers: Which Has the Future?; Atlantic Sentinel; N/A; 29JUL2011; http://atlanticsentinel.com/2011/07/amphibs-vs-carriers-which-has-the-future/

[4] N/A; ‘Floating base’ deploys to Gulf: US Navy; Agence France-Presse; Washington, D.C.; 07JUL2012; http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/floating-base-deploys-to-gulf-us-navy-1.1045755

[5] Monick, S.; “Victory in Hades: The Forgotten Wars of Oman 1957-1959 and 1970-1976, Part 2A: The Dhofar Campaign 1970-1976”; Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 12, Nr 4; Saldanha, South Africa; 1982; http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/600 ; pp. 23

[6] N/A; Libya: UK Apache helicopters used in Nato attacks; BBC; N/A; 04JUN2011; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13651736
A few additional notes.

1) Because I was writing about the Dhofar Rebellion, I compared the deployment of USS Ponce with the deployment of a similar vessel off the Dhofari coast during Operation Badree. I was unaware until recently that a similar approach was used in Falklands War of 1982. The US Navy is currently expanding upon this capability (source, source) as a continuation of its use of the Ponce. As that first source article notes:
The idea is for these cheaper vessels wherever possible to take the places of the Navy’s front-line destroyers, cruisers, amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, maintaining American presence on routine patrols while freeing up the tougher, more expensive warships like the flattop Ford to prepare for what they do best: fight a full-on shooting war.
The Navy has made some other smart purchases as well. I've already noted their pursuit of economies of scale by capitalizing on the F/A-18 platform. The Navy has also been able to develop economies of scale in the production of the Virginia Class submarine fleet, as well as converting four of the existing Ohio Class ballistic missile submarines instead of retiring them entirely in accordance with treaties between the United States and Russia. The Littoral Combat Ship has been a bit more problematic, but the Navy's overall record has been strong - arguably stronger than those of its peers.

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Just for Fun: Mapping the Hornbeam Line

I've written extensively on the Operation Highlander blog about my dissertation on the Dhofar Rebellion. As regular readers of both the Operation Highlander blog and this one may have gathered, I'm fascinated by geography and maps. One of the things I tried to do was to compare the handful of available maps from the conflict with the various maps available through Wikimapia and Google Maps. Several years spent undergoing classroom instruction from the Marine Corps taught me just how critical a factor geography is to the prosecution of a military campaign, and my study of the conflict in Dhofar inspired a big interest in the geography of that particular campaign.

It took some creative work combining Wikimapia, PowerPoint, and Windows Paint, but I was finally able to find the final Location: Patrol Base Pipe
Coordinates: 16.882449° N, 53.759724° E
Remarks: Located using maps from In the Service of the Sultan by Ian Gardiner and We Won a War by John Akehurst. If location is correct, position appears to be abnormally small.

Location: Patrol Base Whale
Coordinates: 16.927313° N, 53.747848° E
Remarks: N/A

Location: Patrol Base Ashawq/Ashoq
Coordinates: 16.936920° N, 53.735703° E
Remarks: N/A

Location: Patrol Base Killi
Coordinates: 16.972069° N, 53.731915° E
Remarks: Site displays distinct square seen elsewhere at PB Reef and PB Bole.

Location: Patrol Base Killi (Satellite)
Coordinates: 16.975117° N, 53.733069° E
Remarks: Small position with circular formations located west and northeast of due center. Possible PB Killi satellite observation post.

Location: Patrol Base Reef
Coordinates: 17.005118° N, 53.743272° E
Remarks: Displays distinct square seen elsewhere at PB Killi and PB Bole.

Location: Patrol Base Kumasi (Site #1)
Coordinates: 17.029440° N, 53.727919° E
Remarks: Site displays several distinct "diamond ring" formations, which are artillery pits, consistent with Gardiner's map indicating that Kumasi was an artillery point. Located directly northwest of PB Kumasi Site #2.

Location: Patrol Base Kumasi (Site #2)
Coordinates: 17.028299° N, 53.731781° E
Remarks: Possesses features more indicative of a fortified perimeter than accompanying site. Located directly southeast of PB Kumasi Site #1.

Location: Patrol Base Bole
Coordinates: 17.063200° N, 53.680573° E
Remarks: Displays distinct square seen elsewhere at PB Killi and PB Reef, as well as apparent fortified perimeter markings similar to PB Ashawq and PB Kumasi Site #2.

Location: Patrol Base Bole (Satellite)
Coordinates: 17.063200° N, 53.680573° E
Remarks: Possibly a satellite observation post of PB Bole.

Location: Patrol Base Oven
Coordinates: 17.189088° N, 53.631102° E
Remarks: Located by following markings of apparent Hornbeam Line remnants northward from site of PB Bole.

By using Google Earth, or Wikimapia's Google Satellite and Bing Satellite options, you can see the actual "line" of the Hornbeam Line. Before I left Scotland, I had the opportunity to meet for a couple of hours with retired Royal Marines Brigadier Ian Gardiner, a Dhofar veteran and author of In the Service of the Sultan, and I showed him a slide deck I'd assembled detailing these findings. Based upon his book and our discussion, here are a few additional notes.

1) He believes that the distinctive square formations at PB Killi, PB Reef, and PB Bole were enclosures for livestock. I had originally suspected that they were helicopter landing pands, by a closer inspection of PB Kumasi Site #1 using Google Earth (pictured) revealed three helicopter pads. I also found similar helipads at this site further to the west, which I believe to be one of the positions from the Imperial Iranian Task Force's Damavand Line.

2) Brigadier Gardiner informed me that there were "two Kumasis". He confirmed that the "diamond ring" formations are the remnants of artillery pits. It looks like one of the sites was the main patrol base, and the adjacent position was the gunnery section.

3) In both his book and during our conversation, Brigadier Gardiner mentioned that the line is probably still dangerous since various factors ranging from weather, to animals, to insurgents tended to relocate the land mines that gave the Hornbeam Line its teeth. He mentions in his book that much of the barbed wire has been repurposed by the locals for their own animal enclosures.

A little bit of work on Google Earth following Operation Irene was eye-opening. It showed me just how steep some of those slopes are, as well as how deceptive some of the overhead visuals are. There were several positions that looked to me like they were down in depressions or gullies, when they're actually all on pretty high ground.

My efforts will continue as I have time. I'd like to find the rest of the Damavand Line, and some other terrain features.

Monday, February 10, 2014

More Snowed-In Advice

The other day, I wrote about survival in place during inclement conditions. A friend of mine (who's admittedly far more of a "prepper" than me) posted some of his observations on Facebook, and I wanted to share them to a wider audience.
Things learned from the weather.

We lost power for about 24 hours beginning early Sunday morning. We have wood heat so heat was not an issue.

I have an Aladdin oil lamp my Dad got from my Grandpa and have reconditioned it and it works great. I also picked up one at a garage sale and got it going. They both work well. One thing I did notice was that the dark walls in our living room do not reflect light and it takes more sources to light the room.

We have a small generator that I used to keep the frig and freezer cold. Just ran it an hour on each one and everything stayed cold.

The LED lanterns work great and I will be adding one of those to the stash.

The generator burns gas pretty quick, about a quart per hour so if you had to run it all day that would be 6 gallons of gas.

Things like white gas and lamp oil go very quickly. In an extended outage, these items would probably be gone in the first week.

We used a propane camp stove to cook with. Just set it on top of our stove in the kitchen and it worked great.

Fortunately, we have city water and gas hot water heater. In the country you would need a generator to power your well pump, although that could be an intermittent thing.

Boredom sets in quick. We ended up playing Scrabble. We have tons of board games so we would have lots to fall back on. Plus, chores would start kicking in once the conveniences of modern day life were gone.
My experience was similar, although the closest I got to losing power was three blinks on Saturday evening. I didn't have a huge stockpile of food, but there was also no realistic expectation that I'd go more than two or three days without being able to leave the house. Even so, I probably would have needed to get pretty creative to keep myself comfortably fed for much longer; and even with cable and Internet access, cabin fever was still setting in. These are good lessons to learn in temporarily inconvenient situations, so that you can prepare for potentially prolonged disturbances.

Saturday, February 8, 2014

Snow Day Documentaries

I'm snowed in, so instead of making the most of my time by studying, I decided to compile links to a bunch of documentaries about Afghanistan that are available on YouTube. I figured I'd share.

By the way, as you can see from the picture, my advice from about a year ago was pretty accurate in 2013 and thus far in 2014. I have yet to witness a zombie apocalypse, a collapse of Western society, or a massive uprising against the American government. What I have seen plenty of, both back in the States and prior to leaving Scotland, has been inclement weather and naturally occurring phenomena. These incidents haven't required those affected to escape and live off the land; rather, it's required them to prepare, resource, and execute plans to wait at home until conditions improve. (As for yours truly, I could stand to have a couple more packs of ground lamb, but the power and the Internet have been solid, so I'm a pretty happy camper.)

Anyway, here are the documentaries.

* * *

First and foremost, these are well worth the time to watch.

  • British Marines fight The Taliban 1 of 4
  • British Marines fight The Taliban 2 of 4
  • British Marines fight The Taliban 3 of 4
  • British Marines fight The Taliban 4 of 4
  • Our War: Ambushed
  • Our War: The Invisible Enemy
  • Our War: Caught in the Crossfire
  • Our War: The Lost Platoon
  • Our War: Into the Hornet's Nest
  • Our War: Series II - Return to Death Valley
  • The Battle for Bomb Alley (1/2)
  • The Battle for Bomb Alley (2/2)

    Filmmaker Chris Terrill has made two great documentary series' about the Royal Marines and Afghanistan, and these are listed below.

  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 1 - The Shock of Capture
  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 2 - Carrot and Stick
  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 3 - The Lost Patrol
  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 4 - Tears and Fears
  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 5 - Enemy Contact
  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 6 - Operation Sparrowhawk
  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 7 - Dawn Assault
  • Commando: On the Front Line: Episode 8 - Royal Marines To Your Duties
  • Commando: On the Front Line: The 55 Year Old Commando
  • Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Deadly Underfoot
  • Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Venus Fly Trap
  • Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Dogs of War
  • Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Kill or Capture
  • Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - Brothers in Arms
  • Royal Marines: Mission Afghanistan - The Final Reckoning

    This next documentary is best watched in concert with this report.

  • The Battle for Marjah

    This next selection is excellent, though I see that YouTube has removed a number of the episodes. The link to the actual BBC Episode Guide is included as the fourth link.

  • Young Soldiers: The Shock of Capture
  • Young Soldiers: Should I Stay or Should I Go
  • Young Soldiers: Countdown to Afghan
  • BBC Episode Guide

    I haven't watched any of these documentaries yet, but I may over the course of the next week.

  • Fighting the Taliban
  • Australia's Secret War - Tour of Duty
  • Dateline Behind Enemy Lines (1/2)
  • Dateline Behind Enemy Lines (2/2)
  • Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4
  • Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4
  • Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4
  • Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand 2/4
  • The TA and The Taliban: 2 Scots (1/3)
  • The TA and The Taliban: 2 Scots (2/3)
  • The TA and The Taliban: 2 Scots (3/3)
  • The TA and The Taliban: 2 Para (1/3)
  • The TA and The Taliban: 2 Para (2/3)
  • The TA and The Taliban: 2 Para (3/3)
  • Meeting the Taleban (1/4)
  • Meeting the Taleban (2/4)
  • Meeting the Taleban (3/4)
  • Meeting the Taleban (4/4)
  • Endgame Afghanistan 1/2
  • Endgame Afghanistan 2/2

    That's it for now. Check back soon.
  • Friday, February 7, 2014

    A Few Recent Selections

    I have a long list of articles I want to discuss at length. I've been busy with a few other projects lately, so in lieu of some of those articles, here are some of the items I've been attempting to keep abreast of lately.

    China
  • Perception outweighs ability as China builds blue-water fleet - News - Stripes
  • China Thinks It Can Defeat America in Battle

    Equipment
  • PONI Live Debate: Triad Modernization | Center for Strategic and International Studies
  • Saving the Kiowa
  • SecDef Should Crack Whip On Cyber, Drones, & Training Foreigners | Small Wars Journal
  • Connecting Air Support Acquisitions and National Strategy | Small Wars Journal
  • US Plans Radical Upgrade of Stryker Brigades
  • Trouble Brewing Between US Army's Active Duty and Guard Forces
  • Is Precision the Future of CAS?
  • Army Modernization Is Melting Down
  • $1B in Air Force cargo planes sent to boneyard get new missions - U.S. - Stripes
  • Bring on the Countermeasure Drones
  • The Navy’s Getting a Big, Secretive Special Operations ‘Mothership’

    Security
  • CSIS: Considering the Caucasus Emirate Chemical Attack Threat to Sochi

    Strategy
  • Speaking of the Long War
  • French Counterterrorism in the Sahel
  • Is War Too Important to be Left to Social Scientists?
  • Counterinsurgencies and Deterrence
  • Lessons From Previous Competitive Strategies
  • Peace, Art and … Special Operations
  • Does America Have Any Naval Strategists Anymore?
  • Failure to Learn: Reflections on a Career in the Post-Vietnam Army
  • Five Questions with Steven Metz on U.S. Landpower
  • Learning Large Lessons from Small Wars
  • Lessons Observed on Lessons Observed: IEDs, Advising, and Armor
  • The misuse of American might, and the price it pays
  • Army Presses Case for Relevance of Ground Forces (UPDATED)

    Gulf Region
  • Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the "Clash within a Civilization"
  • 191 Nepalis died in Qatar last year - Kuwait Times | Kuwait Times
  • Qatar: Syria rebels' tiny ally in the background
  • The Geneva Joint Plan Of Action: How Iran Sees It (1)
  • America Must Assuage Saudi Anxiety - NYTimes.com
  • Oman orders NASAMS air defense system

    Afghanistan
  • Pakistani Unconventional Warfare Against Afghanistan
  • Taking Tea with the Taliban
  • Why U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan

    Other
  • WW1 soldier diaries placed online by National Archives
  • Deer 'pose biggest threat' to Scotland's native woodlands
  • Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza | RAND
  • This Is How the World Could Have Ended